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IS ARTICLE 21 OF THE ROME STATUTE AN IMPEDIMENT TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTENCING PRINCIPLES AT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
Colin Flynn*
Abstract
Nine individuals have been convicted of various offences at the
International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2002. While the ICC has issued
hundreds of decisions on procedural and substantive matters, sentencing
of those found guilty of offences of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide and offences against the administration of justice, has been very
much an afterthought. This is largely because the Rome Statute provides
limited guidance for the Court in its sentencing matters. Rationales for
sentencing focusing on principles to guide the sentencing process are not
provided in the Statute. Article 21 of the Rome Statute, titled "Applicable
Law', provides a process by which the ICC is to determine the law to
apply to any issue before it. The ICC, in its sentencing decisions, has
simply ignored the provisions of Article 21, and has stated, without
analysis, the principles of sentencing it considers should apply in its
sentencing decisions. In failing to follow the approach obligated by
Article 21, the Court fails its legal obligation on two fronts. First, it fails
to analytically determine if it can ever consider rationales for punishment
through the adoption of principles of sentencing. Second, it fails to
analyze which principles of sentence should apply for sentencing matters
before the ICC. This article focuses on the first issue- how the Court,
through the application of Article 21 (Applicable Law), can consider
principles of sentence in its determination of sentences to apply to each
case before it. It argues that the Court is obliged to follow the three-step
process set out in Article 21 to determine that issue. It further argues that
a proper analytical approach utilizing Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome
Statute can give the Court legitimate legal authority to consider which
principles of sentence should apply to matters before it. The article
concludes that failure to follow the dictates of Article 21 can lead to an
erosion of confidence in the Court and its decisions. In a time when the
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ICC is under increased scrutiny, its legitimacy as an institution is crucial
to its survival. A proper application of Article 21, as set out in this article,
can greatly assist the court in enhancing its legitimacy in the international
community
I.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ROME STATUTE .................................

54

II.

WHAT IS ARTICLE 21 OF THE ROME STATUTE .......................... 56

III.

STEP ONE AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES (VCLT)................................................60

A.

The Textual Interpretationand the Influence

of the VCLT ...................................................................... 60
B.

IV.

The Attempt to Apply a Textual Approach
to Sentencing at the ICC...................................................64

STEP TWO - TREATIES AND THE PRINCIPLES AND
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW...............................................68

A . Treaties.............................................................................68
B. Principlesand Rules of InternationalLaw.......................71

V.

STEP THREE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW DERIVED
BY THE COURT FROM NATIONAL LAWS OF LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD..........................................................75

VI.

THE APPROACHES TO SENTENCING FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES ADOPTED BY COUNTRIES OF THE MAJOR
SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD..........................................................80

A.

B.

VII.
VIII.

Common Law Countries...................................................81
1. Australia .................................................................... 84
2. C anada ....................................................................... 85
3. United K ingdom ........................................................ 87
Civil Law Countries..........................................................88
1. Germany .................................................................... 89
2. France ........................................................................ 92

WHAT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS?.....

......

PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW ...................................

93

96

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has its statutory
underpinnings in a treaty agreed to in Rome on July 17, 1998. Known as
the Rome Statute, the treaty contains provisions defining offenses within
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/2
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the jurisdiction of the court, the legal rules that apply in the determination
of a case before the court, the procedural processes to be undertaken, from
investigation through prosecution to sentencing, and the processes by
which appeals are to be undertaken.'
As an international treaty, all recognized sources of international law
would generally apply to the Rome Statute. These sources of international
law are the sources set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (IJC), 2 and include treaties, customary international law,
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and the judicial
decisions and writings of highly qualified publicists as secondary sources
of international law. 3 However, the drafters of the Rome Statute were
more particular as to the sources of law that should apply to the Rome
Statute, and the manner in which they should apply.
The drafters adopted Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which sets out
how the ICC is to determine the law to apply to matters that come before
it. It contains mandatory language requiring the court to adhere to a threestep hierarchical process to determine the law applicable to any situation,
both substantive and procedural, that comes before the Court. The ICC
generally references Article 21 when outlining the articles of the Rome
Statute that the court uses in its decision-making process for a case.
While the ICC has generally adhered to the strictures of Article 21,
there are times when it has strayed beyond those strictures in order to
reach its decision. 4 While some writers have applauded this more
expansive approach by the Court, others have been critical of the Court's

1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 27, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3,

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/07/19980717%2006-33%20PM/volume-2187-I-38544English.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDR3-KTBU] [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, U.N. Charter annex,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf [https-//perma.cc/U9BA-88YY] [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].

3.

Id art. 38.

4. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2705, Decision on the
Defense Request to Reconsider the "Order on Numbering of Evidence" of 12 May 2010, 1 15
(Mar. .30, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011 _03026.PDF [https://perma.cc/

8Z7V-PNWK]; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2727-Red, Redacted Decision on
the Prosecutor's Application to Admit Rebuttal Evidence from Witness, ¶ 41 (Apr. 28, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_05473.PDF
[https://perma.cc/7P66-VKFV];
Prosecutor v. Nourain, ICC-02/05-03/09-410, Decision on the Defense Request for a Temporary
Stay of Proceedings (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_09218.PDF

[https://perma.cc/ZDP9-8U87]; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-0l/06-3040-Anx,
Decision of the plenary of judges on the Defence Application of 20 February 2013 for the

disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun Song from the case,

¶ 59 (June 11, 2013), https://www.icc-

cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2013_04193.PDF [https://perma.cc/SEJ3-VFF4].
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failure to adhere to its legislative mandate. 5 In the area of sentencing,
however, the Court has simply ignored the requirements of Article 21 of
the Rome Statute when considering which principles to apply to the
sentencing process, and has adopted sentencing principles and imposed
sentences with no consideration whether such comply with the provisions
of Article 21. The Court has also made no determination if the principles
that it does espouse are consistent with the purpose and principles of the
Rome Statute.
This Article argues that, other than a superficial overview of certain
words in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC to date has provided
no analysis of its authority to even consider sentencing principles, nor
what principles in particular would apply to ICC sentencing. The
principles applied at the sentencing stage of any prosecution are
important. The trial process does not provide the Court the opportunity to
overtly express the individual or collective view of the acts committed,
the importance of their prosecution to the international community, and
why it is necessary to sanction that activity through the punishment
process. It is left to the sentencing process to perform that function. A
court performs these functions by focusing on the rationales reflected in
the principles for the imposition of the punishments for the particular
accused. As D'Ascoli has emphasized:
Goals of punishment are essential to any system of criminal
justice in so far as they determine the character of the legal
system and its effectiveness, the severity of sentences and
the process of their execution ... [the] absence of
penological [justifications in the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals and of the ICC] . . . weakens attempts by those
institutions to exercise principles of criminal justice in a
rationally founded and accepted way. To determine the
appropriate goals of international sentencing is therefore of
vital importance for the system of international
justice . .. international justice might pursue different
strategies of prosecution depending on which purpose of
sentencing is considered . .. most important. 6
In the international criminal law context, these rationales are the
connection between the nature of the acts committed, their effects on the
individuals as victims of these actions, and their impact on the larger
community, both particular communities and the global community.
5. Joseph Powderly, The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretative

Judicial Function,

in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 498

(Carsten Stahn ed., 2015); Gilbert Bitti, Article 21 and the Hierarchyof Sources of Law before
the

ICC, in

THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 443 (Carsten Stahn

ed., 2015).
6. SILVIA D'ASCOLI, SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33-34 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/2
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These rationales for the imposition of a sentence should reflect the values
that are held most sacred by the system, values which are recognized and
accepted by the community at large. These rationales also influence the
type and quantum of the particular sentence that should be imposed for
the perpetration of particular offenses.7 By this process, a court justifies,
or at least attempts to justify, any deprivation of liberty that results from
the sentencing process.8 The rationales, as reflected through the
principles for sentencing, perform these vital functions in the
international criminal law process, and are essential to the sustained
legitimacy of international criminal law.
However, the Rome Statute makes no reference to the principles that
are to apply at sentencing in Part 7 of the Statute, which addresses
sentencing. Nor is it addressed in Chapter 7 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. 9 The Court, in its sentencing decisions to date, has not
addressed these lacunae in the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, but has, just in a perfunctory manner, decided that certain
principles should apply to the sentencing process.
This is a serious defect in the analytical reasoning of the Court. This
Article argues that before the Court can even consider which principles
of sentencing might apply to a particular case before it, it must address
what legislative authority the Court has to do so. This Article explores
whether pursuant to the Applicable Law provisions of Article 21 of the
Rome Statute, the Court has legal authority to consider what principles
of sentencing should apply for violations of crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC. Is there an analytical process the Court can undertake to
consider principles of sentencing, or must the signatories to the Rome
Statute seek an amendment to Part 7 to include principles of sentencing
within its provisions? This Article attempts to answer this question by
exploring the, application of the provisions of Article 21 as they apply to
7. See Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International Sentencing Law: In Search of a

Justificationand CoherentFramework, 6 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 195, 224 (2006) (arguing that
in order to decide what punishment to impose and the amount of that punishment it must first be

established what is the justification for punishment and why is this justification appropriate in this
case. That decision gives credence to the imposition of the punishment, and that determination,
they suggest, will also have some influence on the type and quantum of the penalty to be imposed.

They argue that a sentence may well be different depending if the justification for it is because of
rehabilitative principles versus retributive principles. The mechanism by which the actual type
and quantum of sentence is imposed is for them a distinct aspect of the process-it is the 'method
of sentencing.').
8. See ANTONY DUFF & DAVID GARLAND, Thinking About Punishment, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT 1, 2 (1994) (arguing that the failure to justify the deprivation of liberty would result
in that deprivation of liberty being considered morally wrong).
9. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, ICC-PIOS-LT-03004/19 (2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Publications/Rules-of-Procedure-and-Evidence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M43N-D6QM].
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sentencing, and concludes that Article 21(1)(c), properly utilized, allows
the Court to consider the principles of sentencing to apply to its
sentencing decisions.
In essence the Court must look to "general principles of law
derived . .. from national laws of legal systems of the world" 10 in order
to attain authority to even consider principles of sentencing. Once that
authority is determined, the Court can then consider which principles of
sentencing should apply to any case before it. The analysis the Court
should undertake is set out in this Article. While arguably long and
detailed in its approach, it is the position here that this analysis is one that
must be undertaken if the ICC is to properly apply the provisions of the
Rome Statute to its sentencing decisions.
To develop this analysis, it is first necessary to canvas the provisions
of the Rome Statute, and in particular the provisions of Article 21 of that
statute, and how these provisions operate. It is then necessary to
determine if, using these provisions, there is room for the ICC to adopt
appropriate sentencing principles to guide its sentencing decisions.
Finally, once that is determined, the ICC can then explore which
principles best fit with the sentencing approach it should adopt.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ROME STATUTE

The Rome Statute creates a treaty-based court. That is, a State party
must agree to be bound by the treaty, either through signature,
ratification, accession, or by some other agreed means." Many of the
State parties to the Rome Statute had a role to play in negotiating the
content of the treaty, and all those bound by the treaty are only so bound
by their consent.1 2 The Rome Statute, which created the International
Criminal Court, is a more complete Code for the investigation, charging,
trial, sentencing and release of those who have been the subject of the
Court's jurisdiction than any other international statute in the area of
10. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(l)(c).

I1.

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 75-89 (2000).

12. The only exception to this general principle is when a reference is made to the ICC by

a Resolution of the Security Council. Article 13(b) authorizes the ICC to exercise jurisdiction with
respect to a crime under its jurisdiction when such is referred by the Security Council under the
authority of Chapter V11 of the Charter of the United Nations. See Rome Statute, supra note 1,
art. 13(b). In such a circumstance, the referred State may not be a signatory to the Rome Statute,

yet, by the operation of Article 13(b), the ICC will still exercise jurisdiction over the non-signatory
State. There are presently two situations in which matters have been referred to the ICC by a
Resolution of the Security Council where the State in which the crimes are alleged to have
occurred was not a signatory to the Rome Statute. The first is the situation in Sudan, referred to

the ICC by Resolution of the Security Council in March, 2005. See S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31,
2005). The second is the situation in Libya, referred to the ICC by Resolution of the Security
Council in February, 2011. See S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). The ICC has taken up both cases,
and both matters are presently in the process of being dealt with by the Court.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/2
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international criminal law.1 3 Divided into thirteen (13) Parts, the Rome
Statute contains detailed articles on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and
Applicable Law,1 4 General Principles of Law,1 5 Investigation and
Prosecution,16 and The Trial.1 7 The Rome Statute also has, through the
Assembly of State Parties, adopted a detailed analysis of the Elements of
Crimes, which, pursuant to Article 9 of the Rome Statute, are to assist the
Court in its interpretation of the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction.18
A set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence have also been adopted by these
State Parties, consisting of two hundred and twenty-five (225) rules
setting out in detail how the Court should proceed in dealing with various
matters. 19

Sentencing is addressed in Part 7 of the Rome Statute, and consists of
only four sections of a very general nature. Sentencing is also addressed
in Chapter 7 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and consists of only
four rules. Despite this limited focus on sentencing, the sentencing
provisions of the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
are more detailed than in any other statute establishing an international
tribunal for the prosecution of international crimes. 2 0 Yet these
sentencing provisions fail to address the justifications for sentencing, to
consider the hierarchy of offenses, or to provide any detailed guidance
for the factors to be considered in the determination of the type and
quantum of sentence.21 The Rome Statute provides minimal guidance
with respect to when life imprisonment should be imposed, when a fine
should be considered, and little guidance as to when and if restitution and
reparations to victims should be imposed. This is in stark contrast to many
of the other provisions of the Rome Statute which are very detailed in
nature and provide clear guidance to the Court. 22

13. See Adrian Hole, The Sentencing Provisions of the International Criminal Court, 1
J. PUN. SENT'G. 37, 68 (2005); Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity To RealizingJustice:
A Theory of the Principleof Legality in InternationalCriminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. L.

&

INT'L.

CRIMINOLOGY

857,

920 (2009);

KENNETH

GALLANT,

THE PRINCIPLE

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 331-37

OF LEGALITY

IN

(2009); Leena Grover, A Call to

Arms: FundamentalDilemmas Confronting the Interpretationof Crimes in the Rome Statute of
the InternationalCriminalCourt, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 543, 552-53 (2010).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-21.

15. Id. arts. 22-33.
16. Id. arts. 53-61.
17. Id. arts. 62-76.

18. Id. art. 9.
19. Id. art. 51.
20. Dana, supra note 13, at 920.
21. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pt. 7 (Penalties).
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pt. 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law),
pt. 3 (General Principles of Criminal Law), pt. 5 (Investigation and Prosecution), and pt. 6 (The

Trial).
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It is therefore left to the ICC to attempt to determine, if it can, the
justifications for the imposition of the particular sentence. It is also left
to the ICC to determine, if it can, what role any justifications of
sentencing should play in the sentencing process, how they might work
in combination with other factors, such as offense types, to attract more
severe sentences, or how they might influence the decision to impose a
fixed term of imprisonment versus a life sentence. Furthermore, the ICC
is left to determine, if it can, how these justifications should combine with
the various factors set out in Article 78 of the Rome Statute and Rule 145
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to determine the appropriate
sentence.
II. WHAT IS ARTICLE 21 OF THE ROME STATUTE
Article 21 of the Rome Statute states:
The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable
treaties and the principles and rules of international law,
including the established principles of the international law
of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this
Statute and with international law and internationally
recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as
interpreted in its previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this
article must be consistent with internationally recognized
human rights, and be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in Article 7,
paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status.3
Unless specifically set out in a treaty or convention, the law applicable
to an issue in international law has to be gleaned from the recognized

23. Rome Statute, supra note

1, art. 21.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/2
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sources of international law. 24 As mentioned earlier, these recognized
sources of international law are those sources set out in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice,2 5 and include: treaties,
customary international law, general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, and judicial decisions and the writings of highly
qualified publicists, as secondary sources of international law.26
International criminal law, as a specific category of international law,
relies on these recognized sources of international law. 2 7 These principal
sources of international law are treated as equal in importance as there is
nothing in the wording of the ICJ statute, or in customary international
law, to give priority to either of the first three sources of international
law.28 The drafters of the Rome Statute have gone some steps further in
their attempts to delineate the applicable law that applies to all matters
before the ICC. Not willing to rely on the recognized sources of
international law as set out in the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, the parties to the Rome Statute set out in Article 21 a hierarchical
order to determine the law that shall be applied specifically to
determinations by the ICC. 29
Article 21 commences with the words "The Court shall apply .... "30
The word 'shall' is mandatory in nature and means that the ICC is
required to follow the order set out in the Statute.31 That order is to first
consider the words of the Rome Statute, then the words of the Elements
24. Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 117
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006); David Kennedy, The Sources of InternationalLaw, 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y I (1987).
25. ICJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 38.
2008); ANTONIO
13-25 (2008) (finding these sources of international

26. See generally MALCOLM N SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (6th ed.,
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

law have
27.
28.
29.

been recognized by customary international law as the sources of international law).
CASSESE, supra note 26, at 14.
Thirlway, supra note 24, at 119.
See Gerhard Hafner & Christina Binder, The InterpretationofArticle 21(3) ICC Statute,
9 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L EUR. L. 163, 165 (2004); Gudrun Hochmayr, Applicable Law in Practice
and Theory: InterpretingArticle 21 of the Rome Statute, 12 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 655 (2014).
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
31. Robert Cryer has argued that the establishment of this hierarchical procedure was
intended by the negotiating States to provide a "high level of [S]tate control over the interpretative
mandate granted to the court." Robert Cryer, Royalism and the King: Article 21 of the Rome
Statute and the Politics of Sources, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 390, 391 (2009). This is in keeping
with the enhanced degree of mistrust which the negotiating States had towards the judges on the
international tribunals, in that there was a perception that if there was not some attempt to confine
the interpretative musings of such judges, judicial activism might run rampant, contrary to the

expressed wishes of those States who would become signatories to the Rome Treaty. See David
Hunt, The InternationalCriminalCourt: High Hopes, "CreativeAmbiguity" andthe Unfortunate
Mistrust in InternationalJudges, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 56 (2004); Antonio Cassese, The Statute

of the InternationalCriminal Court: Some PreliminaryReflections, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 144, 163
(1999).
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of Crimes and lastly the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to determine if
within them the applicable law can be determined. 32
If the words of the Statute, Elements of Crime and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence are not clear, leaving gaps in the legislative structure, then
Article 21 mandates that the Court proceed to stage two of the process.
This is to apply applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law. If the application of stage two does not yield results,
then the Statute requires that the Court proceed on to stage three. Stage
three requires that the Court apply general principles of law derived by
the Court from national laws of the legal systems of the world including,
as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdictionover the crime.
Finally, whatever interpretation is gleaned from this process, at
whatever stage it is determined, must pass through the sieve which is
Article 21(3) of the Statute, which requires that the application and
interpretation of law must be consistent with internationally recognized
human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds
such as gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or
other o inion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other
status.3

Most decisions of the Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeal Chambers of the
ICC have acknowledged that the wording of Article 21 mandates this
hierarchical approach to the application of any applicable law.3 4 The case
32. There is no indication in the Article itself that there is any priority to the three listed
provisions. However, Article 51, paragraph 5 of the Rome Statute states that, "in the event of a
conflict between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute shall prevail."
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 51(5). Furthermore, Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Statute
states that, "the elements of crimes and amendments there to shall be consistent with this Statute."

Id. art. 9(3). This suggests as well that the Rome Statute would prevail in the event of a conflict,
as no inconsistency can exist between the two. See Margaret de Guzman, Applicable Law, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 701, 705 (Otto

Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
33. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3). See Hafner & Binder, supra note 29, at 164;
Daniel Sheppard, The International Criminal Court and Internationally Recognized Human
Rights: UnderstandingArticle 21(3) of the Rome Statute, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 43, 46 (2010);

Stephen Bailey, Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute: A Pleafor Clarity, 14 INT'L CRfM. L. REV. 513,
522 (2014).
34. This strict approach has pervaded most of the decisions of the ICC since its earliest
days. One of the first decisions to consider the effect of the wording of the first criteria in Article
21 was the case of Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01-04-168,
Judgment on the Prosecutor's Application for Extraordinary Review, ¶¶ 33-34 (July 13, 2006),
[https://perma.cc/53JY-F9LQ]
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01806.PDF
[hereinafter Situation in the DRC]. The issue in that case was whether the Rome Statute included
within its legislative structure all the provisions respecting appeals, or whether there was a lacunae
in the legislation that would permit the utilization of other aspects of Article 21. The Court
referenced the plain meaning of the words of the Rome Statue on the issue of appeals and
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of Prosecutorv. Al Bashir,35 summarized the approach that the ICC has
taken and continues to take to the interpretation of Article 21. It states
... according to Article 21(1)(a) of the Statute, the Court
must apply "in the first place" the statute, the elements of
crimes and the Rules .... those other sources of law
provided for in paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of article 21 of the
Statute can only be applied when the following two
conditions are met: (i) there is a lacuna in the written law
contained in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the
Rules; and. (ii) such lacuna cannot be filled by the application
of the criteria provided for in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 21(3)
of the Statute. 36
Article 21 pervades the entire decision-making process of the ICC, as
it applies to every decision of the Court in which legal interpretation is at
issue.

concluded that the wording was clear and definitive on the issue. It left no room for any

consideration of other potential rights of appeal. (see in particular paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of the
decision). The Court took a similar approach in determining if the doctrine of "abuse of process"
can be considered by the Court. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486,
Judgment on Appeal of Prosecutor, ¶ 29 (Oct. 21, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Court Records
/CR2008 05884.PDF [https://perma.cc/UN8X-D23A]. However, in a few casesjudges of the PreTrial and Trial Chambers have ventured beyond the strict hierarchical approach set out in Article
21 and have referenced decisions of the ICTY, the ICTR and domestic jurisdictions to support
their interpretation of the particular legislative provision. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-2705, Decision on the Defence Request to Reconsider the "Order on Numbering of

Evidence" of 12 May 2010, ¶ 16-17 (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR20l I_03026.PDF [https://perma.cc/L93E-A8QM]; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06-2727-Red, [Redacted] Decision on the Prosecution's Application to Admit Rebuttal
Evidence from Witness, ¶ 41 (Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011
05473.PDF [https://perma.cc/DT3G-QF3C]. Robert Cryer has also noted that there are occasions
when the Court has strayed from the strict adherence to the hierarchical source requirement found
in Article 21, and has referenced not only the jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY and to
decisions of the ICJ, but has also referred to academic writings as well. See Cryer, supranote 31,
at 404; see also Robert Cryer, The Definitions of InternationalCrimes in the al-Bashir Arrest
Decision, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 283 (2009).
35. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution's

Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF [https://perma.cc/6Q6P-6A82].
36. Id. ¶ 126.
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III. STEP ONE AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

(VCLT)
A. The Textual Interpretation and the Influence of the VCLT
The first stage of the process is the interpretative stage, in which "a
court or other legal tribunal has to determine the meaning of legal
language in a way sufficiently precise to make a decision in the case and
to provide a justification for the decision.. ."37 It is to be distinguished
from the gap filling process, set out in stages two and three of Article
21(1). Bitti describes the gap filling process in this way:
... a gap in the Statute may be defined as an 'objective'
which could be inferred from the context or the object and
purpose of the Statute, an objective which would not be
given effect by the express provisions of the Statute or the
Rules, thus obliging the judge to resort to the second or third
source of law-in that order- to give effect to the objective. 38
In applying the interpretative process outlined in Article 21(1)(a), the
Court must consider first the words of the Statute, the words of the
Elements of Crime and the words of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. In determining the meaning to be ascribed to the text of the
Statute, Elements of Crime, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the
Court, from its earliest decisions, has acknowledged the applicability of
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. 39 These two Articles set out the approach
courts take to the interpretation of treaty provisions. 40 That approach
focuses on the text of the treaty, looking at the words in their ordinary
meaning, within their own context and in light of the object and purpose
of the treaty. The approach does not single out one interpretative principle
as being superior to any other, but as Grover notes, has resulted in the
development of three schools of interpretation, which are not necessarily

37. Zenon Bankowski et al., On Method and Methodology, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 9, 13 (D. Neil MacCormack & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
38. Bitti, supra note 5, at 426.

39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT]. See Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01-04-168, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's Application for Extraordinary Review, ¶ 33-34 (July 13, 2006), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01806.PDF; Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07521, Judgment on the Appeal, ¶ 16 (May 27, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/

CR2008_03078.PDF [https://permacc/NLK3-FWS7].
40. It is recognized that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are part of customary international

law relating to the interpretation of treaties. See AUST, supra note 11, at 11; Campbell McLachlan,
The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L
COMP. L. Q. 279, 293 (2005).
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mutually exclusive.41 These three interpretive approaches of word in a
treaty are: the textual approach, the drafter's intent approach, and the
object and purpose approach. 42 While the strict hierarchical nature for the
determination of applicable law set out in Article 21 would cast doubt on
the use of provisions of any treaty, such as the VCLT, at stage one of the
interpretative process. Hochmayr offers an explanation to such a concern
which is compelling. He notes that as the Rome Statute does not contain
a set of systematic rules for the interpretation of the meaning of its own
words, Article 21(1)(b) can be used to apply applicable treaties to
determine such meanings. 4 3 The VCLT, as the preeminent interpretative
treaty, could be utilized by the ICC for that purpose. Hochmayr also
correctly argues that as the rules of interpretation in the VCLT are also a
part of customary international law, they would also be considered
'principles and rules of international law' as set out in Article 21(1)(b) of
the Rome Statute.44

The ICC has, for the most part, applied the textual approach to the
interpretation of the words of the Rome Statute. 45 Powderly has argued
that this approach to Article 21 "conceives of the judicial function as a
mechanical and (crucially) manageable process in which the text of the
statute is omniscient." 46 Indeed, the Court has jealously guarded the
mandate given to it by the framers of the Rome Statute as set out in Article
21 to confine any analysis of the applicable law principally to stage one
of the three stage process to determine the meaning of the various
provisions 47 It is recognized that in a few decisions the ICC has adopted
a more expansive approach to the words in the Statute, Elements of
Crime, and the Rules. In the 2011 decision of the Prosecutorv. Thomas
41. LEENA GROVER, INTERPRETTNG CRIMES

IN THE ROME STATUTE

OF THE INTERNATIQNAL

CRIMINAL COURT 43 (2014). See also Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01-05/01/08-3343,
Trial Chamber III Judgment, ¶ 77 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/

CR2016_02238.PDF [https://permacc/WH2U-GNRP] (agreeing with the Trial Chamber Ii's
approach of applying the provisional elements of ordinary meaning, context, object, and purpose,
together and at the same time, instead of in an order or individually).
42. GROVER, supra note 41.
43. Hochmayr, supra note 29, at 667.

44. Id. See Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01-05/01/08-3343, Trial Chamber Ill
Judgment, ¶ 76 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6B5M-M7SJ].

45. See, e.g., Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01-04-168, Judgment on the Prosecutor's
Application for Extraordinary Review (July 13, 2006), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
a60023/pdf/ [https://permacc/8AJQ-LZU8]; Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-

cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_ 05172.PDF; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/061486, Judgement on the Appeal of the Prosecutor (Oct. 21, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05884.PDF [https://perma.cc/8R8G-NXN8], among others.
46. Powderly, supra note 5, at 447.
47. Hochmayr, supra note 29, at 662.
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Lubanga Dyilo, the majority concluded that it had inherent authority to
change its evidentiary rulings after they had been made, referencing in
part Article 64 (2) of the Rome Statute (fairness of the trial), while also
referencing decisions of the ad hoc tribunals to support its position.4 8
And, in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in Prosecutorv.
Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber effectively ignored the provisions
of Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, adopting the control of the crime
theory in relation to co-perpetrators under Article 25 of the Statute. 49 No
such compliance occurred in that case. Bitti notes a few other cases in
which the Court has been willing to stretch its analysis beyond the strict
requirements of Article 21.50 However, there is no evidence of any
attempt by the Court to systematically circumvent the strict textual
interpretation that it has traditionally applied in interpreting the words of
the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, or the Rules. Indeed, in a more
recent unnamed judgment, Judge Morrison essentially refused to consider
the interpretation provide by the ad hoc tribunals that concluded that
seizure of assets must relate to assets obtained by the crimes committed. 5 1
Judge Morrison follows the dictates of Article 21(1)(a), analyzed the
words of the Statute and the Rules, and concluded that assets subject to
seizure do not have to be related to the crimes committed in order to be
seized.5 2
48. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2705, Decision on the defence request

to reconsider the "Order on numbering of evidence" of 12 May 2010, ¶ 15 (Mar. 30, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_03026.PDF [https://perma.cc/2C58-7QHW]. The
minority took the established approach as outlined in Article 21(1)(a), focusing only on the words
of the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence to reach the same conclusion. See
Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2707, Separate Opinion of Judge Blattmann to

the Decision on the defense request to reconsider the "Order on numbering of evidence" of 12
May 2010 (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR201I_03071.PDF
[https://perma.cc/P9QA-AYLG].
49. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the confirmation
of charges (Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF
[https://perma.cc/3EQE-Q7GV]. See also Powderly, supra note 5, at 467-68; Prosecutor v. Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1 (Mar. 14,

[https://perma.cc/UWM52012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF
KL7V]. Judge Fulford in dissent specifically stated that the acceptance of this theory did not
accord with the interpretative structure of Article 21. Id ¶¶ 6-12. He notes that in order to consider
domestic law sources, compliance must be made with Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. Id

¶ 10.
50. See Bitti, supra note 5, at 415-21.
51. Prosecutor v. [Redacted], Case No. ICC-ACRed-01/16, Judgment on the Appeal of the
Prosecutor Against the Decision of [Redacted], ¶¶ 5-7 (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-

cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_01145.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z7UH-3SQ9.
52. Id ¶¶ 62-63; See also other examples of such stricter interpretation of the process for
interpretation

in Prosecutor v. Ongwen,

Case No.

ICC-02/04-01/15-277,

Decision

on

Prosecution's Application for Preservation of Evidence (July 27, 2015), https://www.icc-
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The Court has also recognized, albeit with some apparent caution, the
application of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the interpretative
process.5 3 Styled by McLachlan as the 'neglected son' of treaty
interpretation, Article 31(3)(c) has received renewed life following its
resurrection in the case of Case Concerning Oil Platforms54 where it was
recognized as an important interpretative tool to be used by a court in any
interpretative process. 5 5 Article 31(3)(c) references the use of "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties" as potential guides to interpretation to be taken into account in
the interpretative process. 56 This would include custom, general
principles of international law, and where applicable, other treaties.5 7
However, the Court was also quick to state that it must not use the
concept of treaty interpretation to replace applicable law. 58 This again
inputs a word of caution so that the court does not exceed the parameters
of what the framers of the Statute envisioned.
Bitti and Hockmayr both take the position that the Court must be
careful not to ignore the words of the Rome Statute, as in their view the
intention of the drafters should be given priority. 59 Powderly takes a more
liberal approach, arguing that the Court needs to remove what he calls the
"corseting of the interpretative function" of the Court. 60 While it is
legitimate for the ICC to utilize the provisions of Article 31(3)(c) in its
interpretative process, it should not expand its interpretative efforts
beyond Article 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and Articles 31 of the VCLT
in order to fulfill its interpretative function, as it has done in some cases. 6 1
To do so would be to ignore the intent of the framers of the Rome Statute
in setting out this strict hierarchical structure for the determination of
applicable law. This is not fatal to the determination of sentencing
principles at the ICC. The Court need not stray outside the words of the
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02356.PDF [https://permacc/LWW6-MF82] (interpreting the
language of Article 56(1)(a) Rome Statute); Prosecutor v. Gombo, supra note 44 (strictly
interpreting the phrase, "as a result of" in Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute).
53. VCLT, supra note 39, art. 31(3)(c).

54. See Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003

I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).

55. McLachlan, supra note 40, at 289.

56. VCLT, supra note 39, art. 31(3)(c);

GROVER,

supra note 41, at 61.

57. McLachlan, supranote 40, at 290. In the earlier decision of Prosecutor v. Ruto, the Trial
Chamber also recognized the influence of Article 31(3)(c) in the interpretative process. Prosecutor

v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-777, Decision on Mr. Ruto's Request for Excusal from
Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 102 (June 18, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2013_04536.PDF [https://permacc/TP6Q-ENHT]. However, the court was not willing to
subsume the authority of Article 21 within the broader interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the
VCLT. Rather, it wished to preserve the hierarchical structure of Article 21.

58. Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 182, ¶ 41.
59. Bitti, supra note 5, at 443; Hochmayr, supra note 29, at 462-63.
60. Powderly, supra note 5, at 444.
61. See Bitti, supra note 5, at 415-21.
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Statute, and utilize inventive sources in the interpretative process, as if
this was the only way principles of sentencing can be applied at the
sentencing phase of the adjudicative process. While there are recognized
gaps in the Statute and Rules with respect to the justifications for
sentencing, the Court can follow stages two and three of Article 21 to
determine what justifications should apply.
B. The Attempt to Apply a Textual Approach to Sentencing at the ICC
The first two decisions of the ICC on sentencing simply recite some
of the words of Preamble, the words of Article 78 of the Statute and the
words of Rule 145 and then look at the aggravating and mitigating factors
and impose what was considered the appropriate sentence. 6 2 The focus of
the sentencing decision is that of proportionality. The appeal decision that
followed the sentencing decision outlined the provisions of the Statute
and Rules that apply to sentencing and stated that together with the
Preamble to the Statue, the Statue and Rules "establish a comprehensive
scheme for the determination and imposition of a sentence." 63 The
Appeals Chamber stated further what they must do.
The Appeals Chamber considers that the above provisions
indicate that, in order to determine a sentence, the Trial
Chamber, based on its intimate knowledge of the case, will
have to balance all factors it considers relevant. Therefore,
the Trial Chamber's determination involves an exercise of
discretion with the aim to impose a proportionate sentence
that reflects the culpability of the convicted person. 64
Proportionality is measured by the degree of harm caused by the crime
coupled with the culpability of the perpetrator and is reflected in the
length of sentence imposed. 65 The Appeals Chamber recognized that the
factors set out in Article 78 of the Rome Statute combined with the factors
annunciated in Rule 145 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure are the
factors for consideration in this proportionality exercise. 6 6 The Appeals
62. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-0I/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence (July
10, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07409.PDF [https://perma.cc/989HLF7D] (The Trial Chamber issued its sentencing decision.); Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-3122 A 4 A 6, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and Defendant, ¶ 25 (Dec.
1, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09849.PDF [https://perma.cc/NEE9U44F] (The Appeals Chamber issued an appeal decision in response to appeals filed by both the
Prosecutor and the Defendant, Mr. Dyilo.).

63. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC -01/04-01/06-3122 A 4 A 6, Judgment on the
Appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr. Dyilo, ¶ 32 (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR204_09849.PDF [https://perma.cc/DNS3-77FF].
64. Id.¶34.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Chamber declined to determine how the factors in the two sections should
interact to reach the sentencing conclusion. 67 The Appeals Chamber
analyzes the Trial Chambers' decision on the sentence imposed based on
the analysis of the various aggravating and mitigating factors considered
by the Trial Chamber. 6 8 It concludes no error on the part of the Trial
Chamber in the imposition of the sentence. 69 No attempt is made by either
the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber to explain the purpose of the
sentencing process, or the principles that should apply to the sentencing
process.

Commencing with the third sentencing decision of Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga,70 the ICC imported into the sentencing decisions
certain principles which were to apply at the sentencing stage.71 The
analysis used to adopt such principles is limited, if not non-existent, and
does not comply with the mandatory provisions of Article 21. The Court
concludes that the role of sentencing is to express society's condemnation
of the act and the actor, deterrence, and to a lesser extent, rehabilitation. 72
The Court finds no justification for the first and third criteria within the
wording of the Rome Statute and makes no effort to justify its use through
an analysis of the words of the statute. The Court references the Preamble
to the Rome Statute to justify the use of deterrence as a justification for
such sentences. 7 3 It quotes a portion only of the Preamble to justify. It
states:
... in accordance with the Preamble, "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
must not go unpunished" and State parties are "determined
to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most
serious] crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such
crimes."

74

Contrary to the Court's conclusion, King and LaRosa 5 have argued
that the wording of the preamble supports the goal of retribution at the
ICC. Schabas suggests something different. It is his position that the
section of the Preamble which states that one of the purposes of the ICC
67. Id. 166.
68. Id.
69. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 62, ¶ 32.
70. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3484, Decision on Sentence (May

23, 2014).
71. Id. 1¶ 25-35.
72. Id. ¶ 38.
73. Id. ¶37.
74. Id.
75. Faiza P King & Anne-Marie La Rosa, Penalties Under the ICC Statute, in I ESSAYS ON

312-13 (Flavia Lattanzi

&

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL COURT 311,

William Schabas eds., 1999)
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is to put an end to impunity for those persons who commit such heinous
crimes will 'contribute to the prevention of such crimes' signals at least
76
that the existence of the Court will have some deterrent effect.
However, Schabas is quick to recognize that such a position set out in the
Preamble is far from conclusive that the Statute recognizes that
deterrence is an aim or purpose of sentencing at the ICC. 77 In some ways
the Court appears to follow the position put forward by Schabas in that it
concludes that the punitive aspect of the sentence as a deterrent principle
is not in the length of the sentence to be imposed but rather in its
"inevitability." 78
The Courts' position on sentencing continues in a similar mode for
the other sentencing cases it has decided. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo7 9 the Trial Chamber at paragraph 10 of its decision repeats
the comments made in the Katanga decision that the wording of the
Preamble indicates that the primary objectives of punishment at the ICC
is both retribution and deterrence. 80 Rehabilitation is to play a lesser role
in the sentencing process.81 However, no analysis is offered as to why
rehabilitation is a principle for consideration in sentencing. In Prosecutor
v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi8 2 the same reasoning is used to adopt the
83
principles of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation.
However, in the Trial Chamber sentencing decision of 22 March 2017
of Prosecutorv. Jean-PierreBemba Gombo et al.84 the Trial Chamber
limits the purpose of sentencing to retribution and deterrence, to the
exclusion of rehabilitation. 85 It is possible that as the Trial Chamber was
76. WILLIAM ScRABAs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 314

(2007).
77. Id.
78. Prosecutor v Katanga, supra note 70, ¶ 38.

79. Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, Decision on Sentence (June
21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04476.PDF [https://perma.cc/2DGXTUGH].
80. Id. ¶ 10; Mr. Gombo was subsequently acquitted of all charges by the Appeals Chamber
decision of 8 June 2018. See Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red,
Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 199 (June 8, 2018).
81. Id. ¶11.
82. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15-171, Judgment and Sentence (Sept.
27, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF [https://perma.cc/8V5KSAXM].
83. Id. ¶¶66-67.
84. Prosecutor v. Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13-2123, Decision on Sentence
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_01420.PDF [https://perma.cc/
PZ7C-SJPR].
85. Id. ¶ 19. The Trial Chamber, in re-sentencing three of the five individuals following the
Appeals Chamber decision on sentencing issues, again states that the two principles of sentence
to apply to offenses against the administration of justice are retribution and deterrence. See
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dealing with Article 70 crimes-offenses against the administration of
justice-the Trial Chamber saw such offenses as not requiring a
consideration of a rehabilitative component. However, it does appear
incongruous that for the more heinous offenses of war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide, rehabilitation can be considered as an
ancillary factor in sentencing. While the Trial Chamber in this case does
follow the textual approach with respect to the purposes of sentencing, it
does not do so with respect to the adoption of a sentencing option of a
suspended sentence contrary to the clear wording of Article 76 of the
Rome Statute. 8 6 The Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber's
decision on this point, and did so by reference to the textual interpretation
of the Rome Statute. 87 The Appeals Chamber was not prepared to go
beyond the words of the Statute, and in so doing also followed the
provisions of Article 21 of the Rome Statute. 88 The 2019 sentencing
decision in Prosecutorv. Bosco Ntaganda89 follows the same approach
as the previous trial decisions of Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo et al.90 and Prosecutorv. Ahmad Al FaqiAl Mahdi.9 1
The analysis presented above shows two things. The first is that for
some purposes of sentencing, the Court is prepared to undertake a very
limited and thin textual approach to adopt the purposes of sentence of
retribution and deterrence. It is arguable that the words of the Preamble
relied on by the Court does not support its position. The second is that
when it wishes, the Court abandons a textual approach and simply does
not apply any approach in adopting the rehabilitative purpose to
sentencing at the ICC. The Court fails to provide any detailed analysis,
which can and should be applied to reach the proper conclusion. As will
be argued, the provisions of Article 21 does not preclude the ICC from
the analytical approach needed to adopt appropriate sentencing
principles.

Prosecutor v. Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13-2312, Decision on Re-Sentencing, ¶¶ 18,
139 (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04355.PDF [https://perma

.cc/XV4S-GBWH].
86. See case cited supra note 84, 1140-41. This aspect of the decision was later overturned
by the Appeals Chamber. See infra note 87.
87. Prosecutor v. Gombo et al., Case No.

8, 2018),
1173-80
(Mar.
[https://perma.cc/A2Y7-JXJS].
88. Id. at 179

ICC-01/05-01/13-2276,

Judgment on Appeals,

https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_01639.PDF

89. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-O /04-02/06-2442, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 911 (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_06674.PDF [https://perma.cc

/XQ6V-GLFQ].
90. See case cited supra note 84, 1 19.
91. See case cited supra note 82, 166-67.
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IV. STEP TWO - TREATIES AND THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Treaties
Step Two of Article 21 provides no assistance to the Court in
determining if it can consider principles of sentences in its sentencing
decisions. Step Two is contained in Article 21(1)(b) and focuses on the
application of international law to fill any gaps that occur in the
application of the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. This is in keeping with the general thrust of the
Rome Statute as a statute dealing with international matters, rather than a
focus on domestic matters. 92 The history of the provision, from the first
drafts in 1951 to its final formulation as Article 21 of the Rome Statute is
reflective of the focus on the application of international law.9 3 The
concept of treaties, as one of the principal determinants of international
law, is not defined in the statute. The VCLT defines a treaty as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation." 94 The document known as the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations created at the United Nations
conference in Vienna, Austria in 1989, recognizes that a treaty may also
be concluded between states and international bodies recognized as such
by the international community. 95 The use of the term 'treaty' in Article
21 of the Rome Statute will probably encompass both contexts. 96 What is
92. The earliest drafs of a statute for the development of an international criminal court
contained a provision dealing with applicable law, but the references were to international law,
international criminal law, and 'where appropriate, national law.' See Committee on International

Criminal Jurisdiction, Draft Statute for an InternationalCriminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. SuP
1, 1-11 (1952). Quincy Wright, when commenting on the early drafts of the statute, noted that
there was always an international focus to the court, because of its international jurisdiction, while
recognizing that in some circumstances there may be a need to reference domestic law. See
Quincy Wright, Proposalfor an InternationalCriminalCourt, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 70 (1952).
93. See Ida Caracciolo, Applicable Law, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 211, 211 (Flavia Lattanzi and William Schabas eds., 1999).

94. VCLT, supra note 39, art. 2(1)(a).
95. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and InternationalOrganizationsor between InternationalOrganizations, art. 2,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (Mar. 21, 1986). Article 4 of the Rome Statute does permit the ICC,
as an international body, to enter into agreements with other organizations and with states with
respect to matters under the jurisdiction of the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 4.
96. Vladimir-Djuro Degan has argued that as 'treaties' only bind states or other
international persons who agree to be bound by them, it is really those treaty provisions that have
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of greater concern is the qualifications placed on the word 'treaties.' The
entire subsection is qualified by the phrase 'where appropriate' and the
term 'treaties' itself is qualified by the term 'applicable.' 97 Thus in order
to even consider treaties, it first must be appropriate to do so, and
secondly the treaties of concern must be applicable to the issue of law
with which the ICC is grappling. As the focus here is on sentencing, the
appropriateness of the treaties for consideration would be those that have
any impact on sentencing in international criminal law. Whether a
particular treaty is applicable will depend on the sentencing provision of
concern at the time of its consideration. In the context of the gaps in the
provisions on sentencing in the Rome Statute, any consideration of
treaties must relate to the deficiencies noted, in this case the justifications
for the imposition of a sentence.
Those instruments for consideration include the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 98 the European Convention on Human Rights, 99 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1 00 the American
Convention on Human Rights, 10 1 the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights,10 2 the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,1 03 and the Charter of
the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.1 04 A review of these
instruments suggests that Article 16(1) of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 5
become part of customary international law that would be applicable as sources of international

criminal law. See Vladimir-Djuro Degan, On the Sources of International Criminal Law, 4
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 45, 50 (2005). Robert Perrin has also recognized the problem of the application
of international law treaties and principles to international criminal law, as these treaties and
principles relate to states and state relations and thus may not be adaptable to matters relating to

individuals. See Robert Perrin, Searchingfor Law While Seeking Justice: The Difficulties of
Enforcing InternationalHumanitarianLaw in InternationalCriminal Trials, 39 OTTAWA L. REv.
367, 376 (2008). However, the term exists, and some meaning must be provided to it.
97. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21. There had been some discussion at the
preparatory committee stage between the use of the word 'relevant' to qualify treaty, and the use
of the word 'applicable.' See Caracciolo, supra note 93, at 214. The word 'applicable' was finally
chosen, but the reasons for the adoption of that word appears to have been lost in the discussion.
See id.

98. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
99. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171

[hereinafter ICCPR].
101. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
102. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
103. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].

104. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
2.
105. Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, at 116.
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Article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 0 6 and Article
5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights1 07 each state that
no one is to be subject to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." While these provisions do not directly assist the Court in
the determination of which justifications of punishment are applicable to
sentencing at the ICC, they do require the Court to consider in its choice
of justifications that their application does not lead to the imposition of
any sentence that is cruel, inhuman or degrading.
Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union1 08 may also have some impact on the selection by the Court of
justifications of punishment. That subsection requires that the "severity
of a sentence must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense."'09
While this provision is arguably more applicable to the determination of
the quantum of sentence, its general requirement could also influence the
selection of the justifications of punishment by the ICC. Any justification
selected must not be one that could, by its selection alone, lead to the
imposition of a sentence which is disproportionate to the offense
committed.
Finally, Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights may also have some indirect application to the sentencing issues
at the ICC." 0 In considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed, the
ICC would have to be certain that any justifications of punishment must
treat all persons to be sentenced with humanity, and must be cognizant
that in imposing the appropriate sentence there must exist sufficient
flexibility to allow those sentenced to avail of rehabilitative and
reformative opportunities."' This would not in any way deflect from the
primary principles that should be applied at the sentencing stage, but only
to recognize that once sentenced, all should be treated in accordance with
the requirements of Article 10 of the ICCPR. The Court can sentence for
the overriding reasons of deterrence, denunciation or any other
106. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 101, at 146.
107. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 102, at 247.
108. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 104, art. 49(3).

109. Id.

1 10.

ICCPR, supra note 98, at 176. Article 10 of the Covenant states in part:
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with

respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

2. [. .. .]
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim
of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders
shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their
age and legal status.

ll1. See Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/2
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appropriate principle. Yet, once incarcerated, the individual can be given
access to all programming that will assist in the person's reformation and
social rehabilitation without detracting from the principles of sentence. 11 2
These human rights instruments would also come into play with the
application of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. That provision requires
that the application and interpretation of law "must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse
distinction founded on grounds such as gender, age, race, color, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status."" 3 The ICC has, in several cases,
recognized that both the interpretation and the application of the law it is
to apply must accord with the provisions of Article 21(3) of the Rome
Statute."

4

B. Principlesand Rules ofInternationalLaw
There has been some debate in the literature with respect to the
meaning to be ascribed to the Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(b) phrase, 'the
principles and rules of international law.'" 5 Margaret de Guzman has
suggested that the 'rules of international law' would traditionally be
derived from customary international law."1 6 However she is unsure
whether the phrase 'principles of international law' refers specifically to
customary law, general principles of law derived from domestic law or if
it refers to principles derived from 'the international legal conscience, the
nature of the international community or natural law'."'1 Ida Caracciolo
has concluded that the phrase means customary international law,
inclusive of general principles of law as referenced in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court.1 8 Alain Pellet is emphatic in
his view that the phrase principles and rules of international law 'refers
112.

ROISIN MULGREW, TOWARDS

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL

PENAL

SYSTEM, 214-16 (2013). She has argued this very point and has advocated for an international
penal system that focuses on rehabilitation/resocialization as its primary goal. Id. She recognizes
that this is distinct from the justifications for the imposition of a sentence, which could include

retribution and deterrence as its justification. Id.
113. See sources cited supra note 33.

114. See the excellent analysis of the influence of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute in the
decisions of the ICC discussed in Bitti, supra note 5, at 433-36; Powderly, supra note 5, at 484-

89.
115. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(c); de Guzman, supra note 32, at 707-08;

Alain Pellet, Applicable Law, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1051 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Pellet, Applicable Law];
Alain Pellet, Revisiting the Sources of Applicable Law before the ICC, in ARCS OF GLOBAL
JUSTICE 227 (Margaret M. de Guzman and Diane Marie Amann eds., 2018) [hereinafter Pellet,
RevisitingApplicable Law]; Caracciolo, supra note 93, at 225-27.
116. de Guzman, supra note 32, at 707-08.

117. Id. at 707.
118. Caracciolo, supra note 93, at 227.
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exclusively, to customary international law....'11 9 Vladimir-Djuro
Degan is also of the view that it refers to customary international law. 12 0
Gudrun Hochmayr, using a more analytical approach, also concludes that
'... subparagraph (b) of Article 21(1) of the ICC Statute encompass
customary international law, but not general principles of law.' 12 1
The phrase, in a modified form, appeared in the 1994 Draft Statute of
the International Criminal Court compiled by the International Law
Commission.1 2 2 It read as follows:
Article 33
The Court shall apply

Applicable treaties and the principles and rules of general
international law;
The commentary to the Draft Statute stated:
The expression "principles and rules" of general
international law includes general principles of law, so that
the court can legitimately have recourse to the whole corpus
of criminal law, whether found in national forums or in
international practice, whenever it needs guidance on
3
matters not clearly regulated by treaty.1 2
This wording did not change until the July 11, 1998 Draft of the
Report of the Working Group on Applicable Law.1 2 4 Subsection (b) of
the article now reads, "In the second place, where appropriate, applicable
treaties and the principles and rules of international law [...]." 25 While
the word 'general' was removed, a footnote to the change noted that, "It
is understood that the term 'international law' means public international

119. Pellet, Applicable Law, supranote 115, at 1071. In his 2018 update to the original 2001
article, Pellet uses the same phrasing. Pellet, Applicable Law, supra note 1 15, at 240.

120. Degan, supra note 96, at 80.
121. Hochmayr, supranote 29, at 669. The analysis used by Hochmayr relies principally on
the fact that in the various attempts at drafting Article 21, the final changes for the entirety of

Article 21(1) were made to Article 21(1 Xc), in which the general principles of law were included.
Id. He argues that Article 21(1)(b) remained unchanged. Id.
122. Rep. of the Comm'n to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, [1994] 2 Y.B. of the Int'l L. Comm'n 26-67,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2), U.N. Sales No. E.96.V.2 (Part 2).
123. Id. at 51.
124. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the

International Criminal Court, Report of the Working Group on Applicable Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGAL/L.2 (July 11, 1998).
125. Id. at 2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/2
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law."' 26 Although the explanatory note suggests that the phrase was
intended to be broad in scope, in view of the comments of noted writers
and in view of the wording of Article 21(1)(c), the better position is that
the subsection refers to customary international law.
Pellet argues that the use of the words "rules and principles" together
is nothing more than a verbal tick, while Caracciolo is much more
expansive in her view and concludes it means customary international
law, which would also include those principles of international law that
have now been accepted as part of customary international law.1 2 7 The
ICC in the decision of Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo
concluded that "principles and rules of international law are generally
accepted to refer to customary international law."1 2 8 While the Court did
not reference any authority to support its position, or go into any analysis,
its position is in keeping with the authoritative writers on the subject.
It is important to recognize, however, that while the source of
international law may be customary international law,1 2 9 it is the
application of that law through the rules and principles developed through
that source which is the focus of Article 21(1)(b). Raimondo has
recognized this point, noting that
... international courts and tribunals do not apply sources of
international law, but the rules and principles derived there
from. These rules and principles come into existence in
different ways. These ways are the so-called formal sources
of international law, notwithstanding that the formation of
international law is rather deformalized.... Despite their
126. Id. at 2, n.2.
127. See Pellet, Applicable Law, supra note 115, at 1071-72; See Caracciolo, supranote 93,
at 227. It is notable that Pellet does not appear to use the phrase "verbal tick" in his 2008 article.

128. Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Trial Chamber III Judgment,

¶

71 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF [https://perma cc

/5KEZ-8RWF].
129. Customary international law is generally understood as that which has been accepted

by nations of the world. The two criteria associated with the determination whether a particular
rule has become part of customary international law are that, first, there is a consistent practice
among states that endures over an extended period of time, and second, that such practice is so
recognized by states as constituting a practice by which they are bound (opinionjuris). See BRIAN
D LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATION

6

(2010). However, there has been much debate in recent years on the effectiveness and validity of
these two criteria. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance

Between Modern and TraditionalCustomary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000);
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland Modern Approaches to CustomaryInternationalLaw:
A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary

InternationalLaw, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115 (2005); Yudan Tan, The Identification of Customary
Rules in InternationalCriminalLaw, 34(2) UTRECHT J. INT'L EUR. L. 92 (2018). Yet to date they
still remain the acknowledged criteria by which customary rules become a part of international

law.
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deformalized creation, general principles of law (and
custom) are usually studied in the context of the formal
sources of international law. This is so because the rules and
principles derived therefrom fulfill normative functions in
international law. 13 0
While the sources are not the focus of Article 21(1)(b), it still has to
be determined whether the principles and rules of international law flow
from customary international law before they can be applied by the ICC.
Otherwise they do not have the authority of law as recognized in
international law. In looking at the matter in that light, then customary
international law should be considered in determining if there are rules
and principles of international law which can be considered applicable
law to be relevant to any matter of concern for the Court.
Because international criminal law is still very much in its infancy,
there is limited recognition of the development of customary rules with
respect to many aspects of international criminal law.131 This is
particularly so in sentencing in international criminal law. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) have, in addition to the statutory
requirements that the Court consider the gravity of the offense and the
individual circumstances of the offender,' 32 followed certain principles in
determining
sentences.
These principles
include
retribution,
affirmative
general
ICTY
the
for
rehabilitation,
deterrence,
denunciation,
prevention, and for the SCSL protection of the norms and values of the
international community. 133 Although they may have some persuasive
value, their use by these tribunals does not make them principles and rules
of customary international law. The two criteria of opinionjuris and state
practice are not established by the sentencing practice of these
130.

FABIAN RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 36

(2008).

131. See Tan, supra note 129, at 93-97. There has begun to develop some recognition of the
parameters of the three basic offenses that constitute offenses in international criminal law.
132. U.N. Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia art. 24(2) (May 25, 1993), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2OLibrary/Statute/

statutesept09_en.pdf [https://perna.cc/4XB7-NU25] [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 23(2), S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute]; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra

Leone art. 19(2), January 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137, 151 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
133. See Prosecutor v. Krajitnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 775
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009), https://www.legal-tools.org/

doc/770028/pdf [https://perma.cc/3R65-W8N2]; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T796, Judgment on the Sentencing,

¶

30 (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/

Decisions/CDF/796/SCSL-04-14-T-796.pdf [https://permacc/6NDJ-RZ2Q].
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international tribunals. Indeed, none of the ad hoc tribunals considering
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes have suggested such is
the case. 134
V. STEP THREE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW DERIVED BY THE COURT
FROM NATIONAL LAWS OF LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD

The concept of 'general principles of law' as constituting part of the
law to apply in international disputes has been utilized for a long time by
international courts and tribunals to fill legal gaps, interpret legal rules,
and to substantiate legal reasoning. 135 The phrase appeared in statutory
form in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
as constituting one of the sources of international law.1 36 The wording
was repeated in Section 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. 137 It states that in applying international law the Court shall
apply "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."13 8
There has been a long and unresolved debate whether these principles,
now recognized in international law, are considered part of customary
law, or whether they have an existence independent of the rules of
customary international law. 13 9 Cheng argues that they are distinct, noting
in particular that they only require recognition and not practice, unlike
customary international law. 14 The proponent of the wording of Article
38(3) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Lord
Phillimore, originally intended that 'the general principles of law as
recognized by civilized nations' meant legal maxims that had been
accepted inforo domestico.141 While some particular legal maxims have
received recognition in decisions of international courts as constituting
principles of international law, such principles are not confined to such
maxims.14 2 Both Cheng and Raimondo provide examples of principles of
law that extended beyond legal maxims that have been recognized as
134. The SCSL did not have jurisdiction to consider the crime of genocide, but only crimes
against humanity and war crimes. See SCSL Statute, supra note 132, arts. 3-4.

135. RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 7.
136. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1940 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No.1, art.
D
38(3) at 22, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/permanent-court-of-internationaljustice/serie
/D_01_4eedition.pdf [hereinafter PCIJ Statute].
137. See ICJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 38(1)(c).

138. Id.
139. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND

23-24 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953); RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 36-42.
140. See PCIJ Statute, supra note 136; CHENG, supra note 139, at 24.
141. id. RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 19; see also Bruno Simma, The Contribution ofAlfred
Verdross to the Theory of International Law, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 33, 47-50 (1995) (arguing that

TRIBUNALS,

"general principles of law" are derived "from the shared legal conscience (Rechtsbewusstsein) of
the peoples of the world." Simma states that Verdross argued that these general principles of law
were anchored in natural law).

142.
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principles of law adopted into international law. In particular, Raimondo
includes the principles that "courts must be established by law,"1 43 "no
appeal lies unless conferred by statute,"144 "the definition of the crime of
rape as a general principle of law"1 4 5 and "the impartiality of the

judiciary."' 6
Some writers have opined that what is meant by 'general principles of
law' in Article 38(3)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ differs from what is
meant by the 'general principles of law' in Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome
Statute. Schabas implies that the use of the phrase 'general principles of
law' in Article 21(1)(c) is not in reference to one of the primary sources
of international law, but rather references a process, using a comparative
criminal law methodology.1 47 He argues that that "the better
interpretation is to treat Article 21(1)(c) as an invitation to consult
comparative criminal law as a subsidiary source of norms." 14 8 Powderly
too sees that the subsection invites a comparative criminal law analysis.
He is more emphatic in his position on the substance of Article
21(1)(c).1 4 9 He states that the general principles of law falling under
Article 21(1)(c) are 'not related' to the general principles of law
referenced in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. 150 While it seems
clear that the process envisioned by Article 21(1)(c) invites a comparative
criminal law approach to the determination of 'principles of law'
accepted by major legal systems of the world, that should not preclude
the acceptance of legal principles that have been acknowledged to exist
in accordance with Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.
A comparative law approach may indeed determine that such
principles are accepted by the major legal systems of the world. Indeed,
Raimondo proposes such an approach to be used to determine if there are
principles of law under Article 38(1)(c).15 1 It seems, however, only if
Both Cheng and Raimondo provides numerous examples of the recognition by courts of principles
such as audi alterim partem, CHENG, supra note 139, at 296; nemo jurex in sua propria causa,
CHENG, supra note 139, at 258; resjudicata,CHENG, supra note 139, at 326, RAIMONDO, supra
note 130, at 104 &146; nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 10509; nulla poena sine culpa, CHENG, supra note 139, at 208-12; RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at
145; lex mitior, RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 140; favour rei, RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at

140.
143. RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 87-90.
144. Id. at 91-93.
145. Id. at 133-35, 12-15.
146. Id. at 128-30. It should be noted that Raimondo analyzes twenty-nine such examples in
his study-the ones noted are but examples of the ones he analyzes.
147. WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 391 (Cambridge Univ.

Press, 2010).
148. Id. at 393.
149. See Powderly, supra note 5, at 482.

150. Id. at 482-83.
151. RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 45-46.
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Schabas and Powderly are confining the concept of 'general principles of
law' to their historical roots as proposed by Lord Phillimore, would their
position be justified. It is proposed that the better position is that as put
forward by Raimondo, that through a comparative law analysis, general
principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world
can be discovered which could include those principles of law recognized
through Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.
Raimondo analyzes the provisions of Article 21 of the Rome Statute,
and argues that the purposes of Article 21(1)(c) is primarily to fill the
gaps that exist if the other two approaches to determining the applicable
law do not yield results. 5 2 These principles are ones that are to be
determined by the ICC from its analysis of the national laws of the major
legal systems of the world. In doing so the plain wording of the section
establishes that what is to be considered are not the laws of any particular
jurisdiction but rather 'general principles of law' that are derived from a
review of the legal systems of the world. This suggests a need for a
comparative law analysis utilizing an extrapolation from the major legal
systems. Raimondo has described this approach as having a vertical and
a horizontal component.5 3 The vertical component consists of
abstracting these principles from national legal systems. 5 4 The horizontal
component consists of verifying that the majority of nations recognize the
legal principle involved." 5 The latter involves a comparative law analysis
of the various legal systems to make that determination.1

56

The wording of Article 21(1)(c) refers to national laws of "legal
systems of the world." There is no clear guidance from the statute itself
as to which legal systems should be the subject of comparison, and indeed
how many would suffice. Pellet suggests that the legal systems of the
world would include those of the common law, civil law, and "perhaps"
Islamic law.1 57 The tradition of the ICTY has been to review sufficient
jurisdictions to satisfy the presiding court of the existence or otherwise of
a particular tradition.1 58 The approach of the ICTY has been considered
somewhat weak in its application of the appropriate legal systems of the
world to provide the basis for a conclusion that there exists either

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
to it. See
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 149-50.
at 45.
at 46-50.
at 50-57.

Id. Pellet describes the approach in similar terms, although his approach has three steps
Pellet, Applicable Law, supra note 115, at 1073-76.
See Pellet, Applicable Law, supra note 115, at 1073-74.
See Perrin, supra note 96, at 373.
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customary international law or principles of law that could be relied on
59
by the courts to fill the lacunae in the existing law.1
The ICC implicitly addressed the approach to be undertaken in its use
of Article 21(1)(c) in one of its earliest decisions in an appeal of a pretrial matter. The issue was the power of review on appeal where the Rome
Statute itself did not specifically address the right to appeal Pre-Trial
Chamber decisions on ancillary matters.1 60 The Appeals Chamber
addressed the approach the Prosecutor had proposed to deal with this
lacuna through the use of Article 21(1)(c). The Court concluded that there
was no principle of law emanating from the legal systems of the world
that supported the prosecution's position. The importance of the decision,
however, is not in its particular finding but in its process and method of
analysis. Although the Court did not specifically adopt the conclusion
proposed by the prosecutor, by applying that approach and dismissing the
prosecutor's argument, the Court has implicitly acknowledged that this
approach is a possible way to analyze a case involving an Article 21(1)(c)
analysis. However, it appears that the court did take a rather strict
approach, suggesting that all countries of a particular tradition should be
canvassed. At paragraph 27 Judge Pikis for the court stated with reference
to the practice of states of the Romano-Germanic tradition. The Appeals
Chamber cannot confirm that legislation of the countries enumerated
above reflects a uniform rule finding application in all States having the
Romano-Germanic system of justice.16
If that is the approach to be followed, then the reference to all states
of the Romano-Germanic tradition sets an almost impossible standard
that has to be met before the Court could conclude there are general

159. See Perrin, supra note 96, at 382, 399. Perrin has also postulated that the approach may

represent a departure from the stricter approach envisaged through the application of Article
38(1)(c) of the ICJ, towards a less stringent and more discretionary position of the modern
international criminal law tribunal. This more liberal discretionary position, taken especially by

the judges of the ICTY is both a reflection of the recognition by the judges of that tribunal that as
an emerging branch of international law, international criminal law must take some latitude in
responding to the atrocities with which it is mandated to consider, while at the same time

providing some principled approach to filling the gaps with the existing legislation it must
interpret. Perrin suggests it is a struggle between concerns for the application of humanitarian law
and the need to be fair to the accused. See also Degan, supra note 96, at 375-77; Prosecutor v.

Erdemovi6, Case No. TT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,

1

57 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/

erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd971007e.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL94-YUJT].
160. Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on Prosecutor's Application

for Extraordinary Review (July 13, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_
01807.PDF [https://perma cc/6ZNW-U3EG].
161. Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added).
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principles of law that can be recognized.1 62 The wording of the Statute
itself references "national laws of legal systems of the world," and does
not state all legal systems of the world or all national laws of the legal
systems analyzed. If one is to apply Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT to
this section, the plain meaning of the words used lead to only one
conclusion. That is that reference is to legal systems of the world, and
how many depends on the context and the available information with
respect to them. As well, "national laws" does not include all national
laws, but rather sufficient national laws to be representative of the legal
tradition being surveyed. Again, what is sufficient will depend on the
issue at hand as well as the availability of the information. This approach
is closer to that proposed by the ICTY than that of Judge Pikis. It provides
a proper balance between the need to address the serious issues at hand,
while providing a degree of fairness to the person charged with the
international crime.
The wording of Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute itself will require
the Court to determine if there are principles common to national laws of
legal systems of the world that relate to sentencing of international
crimes. It is important to note that the focus is on principles that relate
specifically to sentencing for international crimes. This is because it has
been recognized by writers such as Henham, 163 Drumbl,1 64 and Sloane 165
and accepted here that the focus of sentencing does depend on context.
And, what purposes and principles that apply to sentencing for domestic
crimes need not apply to sentencing for crimes recognized in international
criminal law.' 66 Thus the focus must be on justifications of punishment
in the international context.
How many legal systems and how many national systems will suffice
for examination is, as has been noted, difficult of determination. A
number of jurisdictions of the common law and the civil law traditions
have in the past participated in the prosecutions of international crimes
utilizing their own domestic legislation or have adopted implementing
complementary legislation to that of the Rome Statute. If the ICC is to
follow the dictates of Article 21(1)(c), it would at least have to consider

162. However, in the end Judge Pikis does not have to rely on this analysis, as he concludes
that there is no lacunae in the legislation and that the wording of the statute itself is determinative

of the issue. See supra note 160, 1 39. There is no necessity to reference Article 21(1)(c) at all to
reach a determination in the case. Id.

163.
(2005).
164.

RALPH

HENHAM,

¶ 32.

PUNISHMENT AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS

MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).

165. Robert Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of InternationalPunishment: The Limits of the
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39
(2007).
166. HENHAM, supra note 163; DRUMBL, supra note 164; Sloane, supra note 165.
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what principles relating to sentencing in international criminal law can be
derived from certain jurisdictions within major legal systems.
Since the major gap identified in the sentencing provisions of the
Rome Statute is the failure to set out within the Statute any justifications
of punishment through the adoption of principles of sentencing, the ICC
will be required to look at any legislation that has been adopted by at least
a sample of countries within these jurisdictions on the issue of
international criminal law, as well as any court decisions that might be
available from these various countries that pertain to sentencing for these
crimes.' 6 7 At a minimum, countries belonging to the common law and
civil law traditions should be included in this grouping. In addition, it
may be appropriate to consider any country of the Islamic tradition that
168
has addressed sentencing for international crimes.
VI. THE APPROACHES TO SENTENCING FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
ADOPTED BY COUNTRIES OF THE MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD

In accordance with the complementarity principle recognized in
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, a number of countries of the common law
and civil law traditions have enacted legislation to prosecute and if found
guilty, to sentence those individuals within their jurisdiction who have
committed genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. A review
of the approach to sentencing for international crimes in these statutes
enacted by a sample of countries from these common law and civil law
traditions establishes that the general principle that the ICC can generate
from such an analysis is that 'principles of sentencing' for international
crimes are essential to guide the imposition of penalties for those who
commit such crimes. Various principles of sentencing are given priority
depending on the approach to sentencing adopted by each country. A
review of the sentencing approaches for those found guilty of
international crimes from the common law tradition-Australia, Canada,
167. See RAIMONDo, supra note 130, at 48. He also suggested that decrees and resolutions
of administrative organs may also be relevant. However, in the area of sentencing in international
criminal law, one does not expect to find such decrees or resolutions of administrative organs.
Thus, one is limited to the review of the legislative endeavors and the cases decided in that area.
168. See John Gibeaut, Rough Justice: Behind the Scenes with the American Advisors to the
Iraqi v. Saddam Hussein Court, 93 A.B.A.

J. 34 (2007); M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael W.

Hanna, Ceding the Higher Ground: The Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute and the Trial of
Saddam Hussein, 39 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT'L L. 21 (2007). As a result of the Iraq war of 2003, the
Iraqi government set up a tribunal to adjudicate cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and

genocide committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003. The law setting up the Tribunal was
based to a large extent on a draft model statute prepared by Professor Cheriff Bassiouni of DePaul
University in the United States. A number of individuals, including Saddam Hussein, were tried
and convicted by the Tribunal and sentenced to death. No reasons were provided for the sentence
imposed. Because of the influence of the United States in the drafting and the execution of the
law surrounding this tribunal, it is difficult to argue such a tribunal was reflective of Islamic law.
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and the United Kingdom,1 69 and from the civil law tradition-France and
Germany, 7 0 support the existence of this general principle.
A. Common Law Countries
At the close of World War II, some countries of the common law
tradition commenced prosecutions of individuals accused of committing
international crimes. There were three phases to these prosecutions. The
first involved those prosecutions undertaken by national jurisdictions at
the close of the war. Such prosecutions were undertaken by Military
Tribunals against mainly German and Japanese military personnel as
violations of the laws of war, as crimes against peace, and as crimes
against humanity.' The second approach occurred in the 1980's and was
a response to a public outcry against the presence in many countries of
individuals who had escaped the initial prosecutions in the immediate
aftermath of World War II, and who had emigrated and had gained
admission to these common law countries. 17 2 Phase one and two of the

169. The reason these were chosen is because the legislation and past history of these matters
is readily available.
170. These countries were chosen for the same reasons as noted for the common law
countries. While there had been some suggestion in the literature that reference could also be
made to countries of the Islamic tradition, it is noted that to date only Afghanistan, an Islamic
State, has adopted the Rome Statute. However, Afghanistan has not adopted complementary
legislation to the Rome Statute for the prosecution of international crimes.
171. In addition to the prosecutions pursuant to the jurisdiction given to the IMT and IMTFE,
Control Council 10 was used by the Allies in prosecutions against German military and civilian
personnel who were in violation of war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace.
Both the British Military authorities and the American authorities conducted prosecutions within
their own zones against individuals considered to be violators of these international crimes. Other
countries, including Australia, Canada, Belgium, and France, used their own legislation to ground
their prosecutions against German military and civilian personnel who had allegedly violated
international law.

172. See Gillian Triggs, Australia's War Crimes Trials: A Moral Necessity or Legal
Minefield?, 16 MELB. UNIV. L. REv. 382, 382-83 (1987); W J. Fenrick, The Prosecutionof War
Criminals in Canada, 12 DALHOUSIE L. J. 256, 257 (1989); A. T. Richardson, War Crimes Act
1991, 55 MOD. L. REv. 73 (1992).
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prosecutions of international crimes by Australia,1 73 Canada, 174 and the
United Kingdom' 7 5 resulted from the enactment of domestic legislation
by each country to authorize such prosecutions either through military
courts or domestic courts. Issues of sentence type was addressed in the
legislation of each country. In phase one, section 11 of the War Crimes
Act 1945 of Australia set out the sentence type available to the court.1 76
This included death (by hanging or shooting), imprisonment for life or
for a lesser term, or a fine and confiscation of property. 17 7 A provision
with similar penalties was contained in the Canadian legislation, 178 and
173. See War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) (Austl.) (authorized the arrest and prosecution of those
who had committed war crimes in respect to Australian citizens during World War 1I). See also
Triggs, supra note 172, at 382; D.C.S. Sissons, The Australian War Crimes Trials and
Investigations 1942-1951 (a military tribunal was constituted to hear the charges, with 814
persons actually prosecuted by military courts under the Australian War Crimes Act for war
crimes committed during World War II.); Michael Kirby, War Crimes Prosecution - An
Australian Update, 19 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 781, 782 (1993) (the War Crimes Amendment

Act 1988 (Cth) was enacted to grant jurisdiction for the domestic courts to hear the prosecutions
of those individuals who had committed war crimes during World War I, and who were now
living in Australia. No one has been successfully prosecuted under the provisions of this statute.);
Gideon Boas, We are obliged to act on atrocities, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 27, 2009.
174. See L. C. Green, CanadianLaw and the Punishment of War Crimes, 28 CHrrTY'S L. J.

249, 249 (1980); Fenrick, supra note 172, at 257; R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 708 (Can.). The
1945 War Crimes Regulations was annexed to the 1946 War Measures Act and became the basis
of any prosecutions before military tribunals for war crimes committed against Canadian
personnel during World War II. Seven persons were convicted of war crimes by the military
tribunal. When Canada amended its Criminal Code to allow prosecution of persons living in

Canada who had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during World War II, no
one was ever successfully prosecuted.
175. Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals 1945, was issued pursuant to the Royal
Prerogative and authorized the participation of the United Kingdom in the prosecution of the
people responsible for the three international crimes agreed to by the Allies. See Regulations for
the Trial of War Criminals 1945, A.O. 81/1945 (UK); see also A.P.V. Rogers, War Crimes Trials
under the Royal Warrant:BritishPractice1945-1949,39 INT'L & COMPAR. L. Q. 780,787 (1990);

Richardson, supra note 171, at 74; R. v. Sawoniuk [2000] EWCA (Crim) 220 [220] (UK); David
Ormerod, A Prejudicial View, 2000 CIM. L. REv. 452. In addition to being one of the major
participants in the IMT, Britain prosecuted over 500 trials of individuals in Europe accused of
these three crimes. In 1991 Parliament passed the War Crimes Act for the purpose of prosecuting
individuals presently living in Britain who had committed war crimes in Germany or its occupied
territories. Only one person was ever successfully prosecuted under this Act.

176. See sources cited supra note 173.
177. See Sissons, supra note 173, at 21. This Act was utilized by the Australian government
between 1945 and 1951 in the prosecution of approximately 1000 war criminals. See Triggs, supra
note 172, at 382. Sentences ranged from short periods of incarceration to death by hanging. A
review of the extensive report of these military trials suggests that the sentences imposed were

based on the nature of the offenses committed and the culpability of each of those prosecuted.
Detailed reasons for the sentences were not provided in his report.
178. See discussion and sources supra note 174. In Canada four war crime trials were held
by Canadian military authorities involving seven accused between 1945 and 1946. All were
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in the authority to prosecute under the Royal Warrant in the United
Kingdom.1 7 9 However the rationales for sentencing were not specifically
addressed by the enacting legislation in either jurisdiction. The reasons
for sentencing in court decisions in phase one were limited to one or two
lines setting out the sentences to be imposed. 180 In phase two, the
Australian legislation provided for penalties of life imprisonment or a
lesser term for war crimes in which the predicate offense was murder, and
a maximum of twenty five years for other war crimes offenses.181 In
Canada and the United Kingdom, the penalties were the penalties
available under domestic legislation, which included a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment for murder and lesser penalties for all other
offenses. 182
The third phase of this process was the adoption by signatories to the
Rome Statute of implementing legislation that would allow the
prosecution in the domestic jurisdictions of those individuals having
some connection to the domestic jurisdiction who have committed either

convicted and four were sentenced to death and executed, while Kurt Meyer's sentence of death
was commuted to life imprisonment. A sixth was sentenced to life imprisonment and the last,
because of the lesser role he played, was sentenced to 15 years. See also Trial of S.S.
BridadefuhrerKurt Meyer, 4 L. Rep. of Trials of War Crim. 97-109 (the sentencing report on
Kurt Meyer simply states that "Meyer was sentenced to death by shooting. The Convening
Authority, however, commuted the death sentence to one of life imprisonment...."). See Fenrick,
supra note 172, at 257, 289-90 (similar to the reports of sentencing in Australia, there is little to
determine the reasons for sentencing from these military courts, except to suggest that the sentence
was based on the severity of the offenses committed).
179. See discussion and sources supra note 175. British authorities acted under the Royal
Warrant of 1945 in conducting over 500 trials of individuals in Europe accused of these three
crimes. Such trials were conducted by military courts, with the ultimate penalty being death. As
with the trials conducted before the IMT, the issue of sentencing was dealt with in a perfunctory
way. No reasons for the sentence were given. As a result, the trials provide little assistance in the
determination of the principles that applied to the imposition of punishment. Congress, Law

Reports of Trials of War Criminals, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/law-reports-trialswar-criminals.html [https://perma.cc/28JW-KSEZ] (a number of cases provide one or two lines
setting out the sentence imposed and if death, whether it was subsequently commuted).
180. See Lawrence D. Egbert, JudicialDecisions, 41 AM. J. INT'l L. 172 (the sentencing
comments of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in particular show a lack of
justification for the imposition of the sentence for those convicted of the international crimes).
181. War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth) s 10.

182. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 (Can.); War Crimes Act 1991, c 13 (UK)
(Canada, through amendments like s 7 to its Criminal Code, and Britain, through various
legislative amendments and enactments, granted their domestic court's jurisdiction to prosecute
persons who are citizens or now residents in the respective countries, of offenses such as torture,
hostage taking of certain officials, and in the UK certain war crimes even if the offenses were
committed abroad). See also Redress, Ending Impunity in the United Kingdom for Genocide,

Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Torture and others Crimes under InternationalLaw (July
2008), https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Jul-08-Ending-Impunityin-the-UK.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE3 L-HWNR].
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war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.1 83 To date only two of
these cases have been prosecuted in the three domestic jurisdictions.
However, a review of the legislation and of the one case that has been
successfully prosecuted does illustrate that justifications of punishment
through the adoption of principles of sentencing for international crimes
are common to all these jurisdictions, even if the priority given to
particular justifications are not consistent.
1. Australia
As a signatory to the Rome Statute, Australia enacted complementary
legislation through the International Criminal Court Act (Consequential
Amendments) Act 2002.184 The Australian legislation sets out the
definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and
where possible, attempts to mirror the definitions provided by the Rome
Statute. However, the penalty sections are specific to Australia with the
maximum penalty being life imprisonment for all offenses of genocide,1 85
some crimes against humanity such as murder1 8 6 and extermination,1 87
and some war crimes such as killing,1 88 and attacking civilians.1 89 Some
other crimes against humanity can attract maximum sentences of 10, 17
or 25 years, as well as other war crimes that attract sentences with
maximums of 10, 17, or 25 years. There are no sentencing guidelines set
out, but the Crimes Act 1914, as amended, applies to sentencing of
federal offenses, of which these crimes form a part.1 90 The main
sentencing approach is contained in section 16A of that Act. 19 1 The
general approach is a focus on the severity of the offense. This appears to
be a form of the proportionality principle. Other factors that must be
considered are set out in subsection 2 of the section. They include, in no
order of importance, deterrence,1 9 2 general punishment,1 93 and
rehabilitation.) 4 The result is an emphasis on the offense itself while

183. See International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth) (Austl.); Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c 24 (Can.); International Criminal Court Act 2001, c 17 (UK),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/17/section/51 [https://perma.cc/BA4D-ACNB].
184. International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 (Cth).

185. Australian Criminal Code 1997 (Cth). (Cth) s 268.3-268.7 (as amended by the
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002).
186. Id s 268.8.
187. Id. s 268.9.
188. Id. s 268.24(2).
189. Id. s 268.35.
190. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Austl.) (as amended).
191. Id. s 16A.
192. Id. s 16A(2)j).
193. Id. s 16A(2)(k).
194. Id. s 16A(2)(n).
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considering the circumstances of the offense as well as the circumstances
of the offender and others.
There have been no sentences imposed under the new provisions of
the International Criminal Court Act. Thus, it is unknown how the courts
will interpret sentencing in this context. However, because there have
been set out different maximum imprisonment lengths, the concept of a
hierarchy of offenses will potentially play some role in the process of
determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
2. Canada
Following the Rome Statute passage, Canada enacted enabling
legislation to allow prosecutions of persons accused of war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide who committed such offenses in
Canada. The legislation also confers jurisdiction on Canadian courts over
a person who committed such offenses elsewhere and that person was a
Canadian citizen or employed by Canada, the person was a citizen of a
state engaged in armed conflict with Canada, the victim was Canadian,
the victim was a citizen of a state involved with Canada in an armed
conflict, or after the time of the alleged offense, the person is now living
in Canada. 195 The definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide were taken from the definitions provided in the Rome Statute.1 9 6
Sections 4(2), 5(3), and 6(2) of the Act provide the penalties for those
who commit these crimes inside or outside Canada.19 7 Section 6(2), in
conjunction with section 8, states that if such crimes were committed
outside Canada by a person now residing in Canada, and an intentional
killing forms the base of the crime, that person shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment. 198 In any other case, the maximum punishment for those
who have committed such crimes is life imprisonment.' 99
The provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada with respect to
sentencing apply to offenses under the Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes Act. 2 00 Section 718 and section 718.1 of the Criminal Code
of Canada are the pertinent sections. Section 718 sets out the purposes of
sentencing, and these include deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation,
and the acceptance of responsibility. 201' The main principle of sentencing

195. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, supra 183, s 8. Unlike most
legislation, this Act applies to offenses committed before the Act came into effect. Id.

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

s 4(3).
ss 4(2), 5(3), 6(2).
s 6(2)(a).
s 6(2)(b).

200. Pursuant to the Interpretation Act of Canada, the provisions of the Criminal Code of
Canada apply, as appropriate to any federal offense. See Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985 c 1-21.
This applies to those cases where there is no mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
201. See CanadianCriminalCode, supra 182, s 71 8s.
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is set out in section 718. 1.202 It states that "a sentence must be
proportionate to the gravity of the offense and the degree of responsibility
of the offender."'2 3 Thus, except for those offenses that have a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, 204 in the determination of the
appropriate sentence the sentencing provisions of §§ 718 and 718.1 of the
Criminal Code apply. How they will apply to these most serious crimes
is unknown to date. There are only two completed prosecutions under the

2000 Act.
Desire Munyaneza, a former resident of Rwanda, had immigrated to
Canada and was charged with offenses under the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act.2 0' He was found guilty of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in Rwanda during
1994.206 In the sentencing judgment of October 29, 2009, Denis, J. found
that the accused had participated in the intentional killing of hundreds of
Tutsis, and concluded that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
applied. 207 And, because he had concluded that the killings were planned
and deliberate, the legislation also required that the accused not be
eligible for parole for 25 years. 2 08 The sentencing judge added that even
if the legislation did not require it, the nature of the acts committed were
so horrendous that a sentence of life imprisonment, to reflect the
seriousness of the offenses, should be imposed, without parole eligibility
for 25 years. 2 09 In other words, the principle of proportionality would
require that the sentence be the severest one able to be imposed in
Canadian law. The only other case brought under the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act, that of Jacques Mungwarere, resulted in
an acquittal on all charges. 2 10
The legislative structure, and the one case that has used that structure,
points to the seriousness of the offense as the overriding consideration in
the imposition of the appropriate sentence. However, the legislation does
call for a consideration of principles of deterrence, denunciation, and
rehabilitation as principles for consideration in the imposition of the
appropriate sentence. Each principle can play a role in the justification
for the implementation of the appropriate penalty.

202. Id. s 718.1.
203. Id
204. These are the offenses of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide that involve

the intentional killing of another.
205. R. v. Desire Munyaneza, (2009) R.J.Q. 2836, ¶ 56 (C.S. Que.).
206. Id. 2089.
207. R. c. v. Desire Munyaneza, (2009) R.J.Q. 2089, ¶ 59-60 (C.S. Que.).
208. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, supra 183, s 15(1)(a).
209. R. v. Desire Munyaneza, supra note 205,

¶ 56.

210. See R. v. Jacques Mungwarere, [2013] O.J. No. 6123 (C.S. Ont.).
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3. United Kingdom
In conformity with the complementarity principle of the Rome
Statute, Parliament enacted the International Criminal Court Act 2001.211
The Act mirrors the definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide as found in the Rome Statute, and confers jurisdiction on
courts in England and Wales pursuant to § 51 of the Act, and Northern
Ireland, pursuant to § 60 of the Act, to prosecute those individuals who
committed such offenses in those jurisdictions, or who committed those
offenses outside the jurisdiction by persons who are UK nationals, UK
residents or for England and Wales, who are subject to UK service
jurisdiction.2 12 These offenses may have been committed before the
individual acquired the status of a UK resident or a UK national, provided
they were committed after the coming into force of the Act. 2 13
Sentences for those offenses involving murder or as ancillary to
murder are the same as sentences for corresponding offenses in domestic
law. 2 14 In cases other than murder and ancillary to murder, the maximum
penalty is 30 years imprisonment.2 1 s In imposing sentences the court must
be guided by the purpose and principles of sentence, as set out in section
142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as amended. 2 16 The purpose of
sentence as set out in that section is to punish offenders, to deter them, to
rehabilitate them and to protect the public and make reparations for harm
done. These are not given any particular priority in the legislation. How
these sentencing provisions will operate in practice is unknown to date,
as there have been no prosecutions undertaken under the International
Criminal Court Act 2001.217
International Criminal Court Act 2001, supra note 183.
212. Id. §§ 51(2), 58(2).
213. Id. § 68(2). However, the Act was amended by § 70 of the Coroners and Justices Act
211.

2009 (UK) c. 25, to allow prosecutions for offenses committed after January 1, 1991 if the
offenses committed were crimes under international law at that time.
214. Id. §§ 53(5), 60(5). A good explanation of the various categories of murder is found in,
Sally Lipscombe & Jacqueline Beard, Mandatory Life Sentences for Murder, HC Library,
Briefing Paper. No. 3626 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk [https://perma.

cc/8BP8-2H7R].
215. International Criminal Court Act 2001, supra note 183, §§ 53(6), 60(6).
216. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 142 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2003/44/contents. However, these purposes do not apply to sentences which are fixed by law. Id.

§ 142(2)(b).
217. Prosecutions have been undertaken under § 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, for
persons committing torture and hostage taking committed outside the United Kingdom by persons
presently residing within the country. Colonel Kumar Lama of Nepal was prosecuted under
§ 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for two counts of "intentionally inflicting sever pain
or suffering in the exercise of his functions as a public official." Colonel Kumar Lama of Nepal
is charged with two counts of torture. The trial began at the Old Bailey in London in February
2015, but was adjourned on March 18, 2015 until August of that year. See BBC, Nepalese Officer
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B. Civil Law Countries
Prosecutions for international crimes took on a somewhat similar tract
to the common law experience in countries of the civil law system. There
were prosecutions of war crimes by both German 2 18 and French 2 19
authorities after World War II. For both Germany and France, however,
the interest in prosecuting war criminals soon waned, to be revived in
Germany in the early 1960's and in France later in that decade. 2 20 In
Germany, because of the statute of limitations, these prosecutions were
first limited to murder, manslaughter and related cases, and in later years
Kumar Lama Torture Trial Adjourned, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/

news/uk-england-sussex-31932371 [https://perma.cc/2ECE-ESJ4] (accessed Oct. 27, 2015). He
was acquitted on August 2, 2016, of one count of torture, with a hung jury on the second count.
On September 6, 2016, the Crown decided not to proceed again with the second charge. Kumar
Lama, TRIAL INT'L (Apr. 14, 2016), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/kumar-lama/
[https://perma.cc/S3HN-U2BV]. See also Sneha Shrestha, The Curious Case of Colonel Kumar
Lame: Its Origins and Impact on Nepal and the UK and its Contribution to International
Jurisdiction, TLI THINK! PAPER (Sept. 1, 2017), https://ssm.com/abstract=3105720. See R. v.

Zardad [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1640 (Eng.), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/88053c/pdf/
[https://perma.ce/2KPY-73K4] (An Afghan warlord, living in the UK, was successfully
prosecuted under the same section for offenses in Afghanistan. He was sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment after which he was to be deported. The sentencing decision is unreported.).
218. German courts were required to utilize the provisions of Control Council 10 when
prosecuting German citizens for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity or crimes

against peace against fellow Germans. The penalties were those set out in Control Council 10,
which included death, imprisonment up to life, forfeiture of property, restitution of property, and
deprivation of certain civil rights. German law was reinstated in 1950 and the original German
Criminal Code of 1871 was again used to prosecute those Germans who had committed atrocities
against others. See Robert A. Monson, The West German Statute of Limitations on Murder: A
Political, Legal and HistoricalExposition, 30 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 605, 606-08 (1982); Fritz
Weinschenk, The MurderersAmong Them: German Justice and the Nazis, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y

137, 138 (1999); NuREMBURG TRIALS FINAL REPORT APPx. D: CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST

SYMP.

10,

HUMANITY art.

i

(3) (1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp (accessed Sept. 5, 2015).

219. The French not only participated in the prosecutions at the IMT, but by Decree dated
August 23, 1945, D 1945 L 216 ... they could and did prosecute those who had collaborated with
the enemy, and by Ordinance dated 28 August 28, 1944, titled 'Relative a la Repression des
Crimescrimes de. Guerreguerre'they could prosecute war crimes committed by enemy nationals
or their agents. See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretationof the NurembergPrinciples by the
French Court of Cassation:From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L

L. 289, 316-17 (1994-1995). The first few years following the end of World War II saw the
prosecution of many in the French courts. However, due to prescription rules that apply in French
law, the time limitations for the prosecution of war crimes lapsed.
220. The revival of interest in Germany resulted from the discovery of documentation from
the Nazi regime which detailed the efforts of the Germany hierarchy in attempting to exterminate
the Jews. See Monson, supra note 218, at 607-08; Weinschenk, supra note 218, at 140. In France,
prosecutions focused on those who had been the decision makers with respect to the deportation
of Jews from France during the Second World War. Examples were the prosecutions of Klaus
Barbie, Paul Touvier, and Maurice Papon. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 675-78 (2011).
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only to murder. 22 1 The German Penal Code of 1871 was the operative
piece of legislation. 222 Fewer and fewer prosecutions occurred after 1979
mainly because of the age of those previously involved. In 2002,
Germany, as a signatory to the Rome Statute, passed legislation giving it
complementary jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide.
France passed legislation making it clear that the laws of prescription
did not apply to crimes against humanity. 22 3 By doing so, it could bring
prosecutions against those three individuals-Klaus Barbie, Paul Touvier
and Maurice Papon-who had been instrumental in the deportation and
subsequent deaths of members of the Jewish community in France. 2 2 4
These three prosecutions were very controversial in France, and took
many years to complete. 2 2 5 In 1992, France enacted new legislation to
address crimes against humanity. 22 6 It was this new law, as modified, that
was to be used to prosecute any individual found in France who had
committed, in France or elsewhere, crimes against humanity. 22 7 France
passed amendments to its Penal Code in 2010 to provide complementary
legislation to the Rome Statute to prosecute war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. 22 8Although existing legislation did allow for the
prosecution of such offenses in France, the 2010 amendments extended
definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and provided
specific penalties for some of these offenses.
1. Germany
In accordance with its acceptance of the Rome Statute in 2002,
Germany adopted a Code of Crimes against International Law. This Code
came into effect one day before the Rome Statute, and applies to any
221. Monson, supra note 218, at 609-15; Weinschenk, supra note 218, at 142-43.
222. Between 1965 and 1969, 361 persons were prosecuted for Holocaust-related crimes and
from those 361 prosecuted, 223 were convicted. Of the 223 convicted, 63 were sentenced to life
imprisonment. From 1970 to 1979, West German prosecutors prosecuted 219 individuals, with
137 convictions, of which 32 individuals received life sentences. See Weinschenk, supra note
218, at 147; see also Patrick Kroger, UniversalJurisdictionin Germany? The Congo War Crimes
Trial: First Case Under Code of Crimes Against International Law, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2016), https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Juristische_
Dokumente/Report Executive_SummaryFDLR EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CQP-DYHP].
223. Sadat Wexler, supra note 219, at 320.
224. BASSIOUNI, supra note 220, at 675.
225. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg Paradox, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 151, 186 (2010).

226. Id. at 188.
227. Id.
228. Loi 2010-930 (2010) du 9 aout 2010 portant adaptation du droit penal a l'institution de

la

Cour penale international [Law 2010-930 of August 9, 2010 Adapting Criminal Law to the
Institution of the International Criminal Court] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/

JORFTEXT000022681235/ [https://perma.cc/SG3M-TRFG]
Law to the ICC].
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crimes committed after that time.2 2 9 Article 1 gives the German courts
universal jurisdiction over the offenses in international law defined in the
statute, 2 3 0 but pursuant to § 153(f) of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure it is only required that prosecution proceed if the individual
under investigation is within the country. 23 1 The offenses substantially
mirror those in the Rome Statute, with some minor adjustments to accord
with German law.2 3 2 The penalty sections for the three offenses in the
Code, however, are unlike the penalty sections in the Rome Statute. They
divide the penalties into life sentences for killing as genocide, 2 3 3 as a
crime against humanity,234 or as a war crime.23s For other offenses under
each head of crime type, the penalties are a cascading range of mandatory
minimums starting at not less than 10 years,236 to not less than 5 years,237
to not less than 3 years, 2 3 8 and lastly, for less serious war crimes, either
not less than 2 years, 1 year or 6 months. 2 3 9 The legislation references the
phrase 'least serious cases' to justify when the mandatory sentences may
be reduced, but provides no criteria to explain that phrase.
The sentencing principles that are to apply in these cases are those
contained in the German Criminal Code. 2 40 The German Criminal Code
contains a section entitled "Sentencing," which encompasses section 46
through section 76 of the Code. 2 41 The main purpose of sentencing a
person under the German Code is retributive. 2 4 2 Section 46(1) of the

1 J.

229. Steffen Wirth, Germany'sNew InternationalCriminalCode: Bringinga Case to Court,
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 151, 152 (2003).
230. See Gesetz zur Einftihrung des V6lkerstrafgesetzbuches, 2002 [Act to Introduce the

Code of Crimes against International Law of 26 June 2002], June 29, 2002, BGBL I at 2254-60
(Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/vstgb/BJNR225410002.html [https://perma.cc/MV
3P-63DW] [hereinafter Code of Crimes against International Law]. Section 1 states, "This Act
applies to all criminal offences against international law designated under this Act, to serious

criminal offences designated therein even when the offense was committed abroad and bears no
relation to Germany." Id. § 1.
231. See Wirth, supra note 229, at 158-59.

232. Id
233. Code of Crimes against International Law, supra note 230,

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

§ 6(1).

§ 7(1).
§ 8(1).
§ 8(4). Take hostage a person protected under international law for example.
§ 6(2). Less serious cases of genocide for example.
§ 7(1).

239. Code of Crimes against International Law, supra note 230,

§

8(5).

240. Strafgesetzbuch [German Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL I at 3322, last
amended by Article 1 of the Law, Sept. 24, 2013, BGBL I at 3671 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/UJ3Z-RTAQ]
im-internet.de/englischstgb/englischstgb.html
German Criminal Code].

241. Id. § §46-76
242. Thomas Weigend, Germany, in THE

HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 252,
258 (Kevin Heller & Marcus Dubber eds., 2011). In a previous article, Weigend has noted that
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German Criminal Code notes that 'the guilt of the offender is the basis
for sentencing'.243 It then goes on to note that the effect the sentence is
expected to have on the offender's future life 'shall' be taken into
account, and under subsection 2 the court is required to weigh the
circumstances in favor of and against the offender.244 However, concerns
for either deterrence or rehabilitation can trump proportionality, and the
maximum sentence the offense deserves cannot be increased because of
other factors. 2 4 ' Nor can it be decreased below what it deserves for the
same reason. How this will translate into sentencing determinations for
those crimes under the Code of Crimes under International Law is yet to
be determined. Nor does one know how the retributive principle, focusing
on the seriousness of the offense, will influence sentencing patterns in
Germany.
The first prosecution using the new Code of Crimes against
International Law involved two individuals from Rwanda, Ignace
Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity for their activities in the eastern region of the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008-2009.246 The prosecution began
at the Higher Regional Court in Stuttgart, and a decision was rendered on
the 28th of September 2015.247 Murwanashyaka was convicted of aiding
and abetting war crimes, while Musoni was convicted of leading a
terrorist organization. 24 8 Murwanashyaka was sentenced to thirteen
years' incarceration while Musoni was sentenced to eight years. 2 4 9 The
written judgment of the court's decision on culpability is lengthy,

the German sentencing theory is complicated and conceptually murky. He suggests that the
traditional desert-based system has been more individualized with reforms since the 1960's. See
Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN
WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 203 (Michael Tonry & Richard Fraise eds., 2001).
243. German Criminal Code, supra note 240.

244. Id.
245. Weigend, Germany, supra note 242, at 258-59.

246. See A First for Germany: Trial of Rwandan Militia Members Under Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction, in 2014 Annual Report, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Jahresberichte/ECCHR_Annual_Report
_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U98-5BF7].

247. TRIAL

INTERNATIONAL,

Ignace

Murwanashyaka

(Mar.

15,

2013)

https://trialintemational.org/latest-post/ignace-murwanashyaka/ [https://perma.cc/HG2G-UMZ2]

[hereinafter TRIAL].
248. James Karuhanga, Government Lauds Guilty Verdict for FDLR Leaders, THE NEw
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/93003 [https://perma.cc/NW

A2-4G86].
249. Musoni was released immediately as he had already spent six years in custody, and in
accordance with German law, his sentence is remitted after two thirds is served. Murwanashyaka

had appealed his sentence. See TRIAL, supra note 247. The Prosecution had also appealed. A
new trial was ordered for Dr. Murwanashyaka, however, unfortunately he died in February of
2019 before a new trial could be undertaken. Id.
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encompassing some 366 pages. 25 0 The decision on sentencing is very
short, and is very limited in scope. 25 ' For each of the defendants,
reference is made to their high status in the FDLR, their family situations,
and in the case of Mr. Musoni, the fact he had renounced the organization
during the trial. 25 2 For Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka reference is also made
of a previous sentence for activities within the FDLR, and the fact he had
not been deterred as a result of the previous sentence. 25 3 However, like
many of other sentencing decisions for offences of this nature, reference
to the purposes and principles of sentencing is lacking. 25 4
2. France
In 2010 France enacted enabling legislation as complementary
jurisdiction to the Rome Statute. 255 The French Penal Code of 2004 had
provided definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity. In Book
II, Title 1 subtitle 1 the French Penal Code of 2004 at paragraphs 211-1
to 213-5 set out the definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity,
and that the penalties for both was "criminal imprisonment for life." 2 56
With the amendments in 2010 a more detailed definition of crimes against
humanity (Article 212-1) is provided, and a more detailed structure set
out for the sentences available to the court depending on the type of
violation of the law. Sentences range from a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment for genocide 25 ' and incitement to genocide, 258 to 15 years
maximum for the offence of engaging in humiliating and degrading
treatment of persons of the opposite party. 25 9 In addition natural persons
can also be subject to forfeiture of civic, civil and family rights,
prohibition to hold office, area banishment, and confiscation of any and
all assets. 2 60 The French Penal Code also states that legal persons, who
are distinct from natural persons, can also be found liable for genocide
and crimes against humanity, and are subject to a grouping of penalties
found in Articles 131-139 of the Penal Code, as well as confiscation of
any or all of their assets. 2 61
250. Oberlandersgericht Stuttgart Urteil vom 28.9.2015, 5 - 3 StE 6/10
251. Ib. Teil 5 Strafzumessun page 361-63.

252.
253.

Ib.
Ib.

254. See generally Kroger, supra note 222.

255. See Adapting Criminal Law to the ICC, supra note 228.
256. Code penal [C. pdn.] [Penal Code] art. 211-1, 212-1 (Fr.), https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/418004/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/3Z7N-7BM6] [hereinafter French Penal Code].
257. Id. art. 211-1.
258. Id. art. 212-2.
259. Id. art. 461-5.
260. Id. art. 213-1. However, the bans are increased because of the conviction for
international crimes. See Adapting Criminal Law to the ICC, supra note 228, art. 462-3.
261. See French Penal Code, supra note 256, art. 213-3.
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The sentencing provisions of the Penal Code apply to the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and it is clear from
the provisions of the Penal Code that only those sentences provided are
to apply. Book II, Title III Articles 131 to Article 133-17 set out the
various penalties that can be imposed for violations of the penal laws of
France. Two points are of particular note. The first is that under the
provisions of this section, if the penalty for felonies for natural persons is
life, then "the court may impose criminal imprisonment for a term, or
imprisonment for not less than two years." 262 Secondly, Article 132-24
states that the court imposes the penalties and sets their limits in
accordance with "the circumstances and the personality of the
offender." 2 63 It therefore seems that the focus of all penalties is on the
circumstances of the offence and the background of the offender. These
are the guiding principles that infuse all sentencing practices in French
courts and should influence the sentencing provisions relating to war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
France has set up a special investigative unit to determine if former
Rwandan citizens, residing in France, should be prosecuted for
international crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide. The pace
at which the French authorities have proceeded in these cases has resulted
in much criticism of the French proceedings. 264 Three persons have been
successfully prosecuted in France
and convicted of genocide committed
2 65
during the Rwandan massacre.
VII. WHAT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE AD HoC TRIBUNALS?

The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL have issued numerous sentencing
decisions. Each of the tribunals have put forth justifications for the
262. Id. art. 132-18.
263. Id. art. 132-24.

264. The case of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, a Rwandan priest who has been a fugitive in
France since the early 1990's, is a good example. His case has been before the French courts on
various issues since 1995. Press Release, The Rwandan Cases: Franceshould arrest Wenceslas

Munyeshyaka,

Laurent Bucyibaruta

and

Dominique Ntawukuriryayo immediately!,
2007), https://www.fidh.org/en/region/

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (July 6,

Africa/rwanda/france-should-arrest-wenceslas-munyeshyaka-laurent-bucyibaruta-and-4467
[https://perma.cc/7HA7-KQB7].

265. Kim Willsher, Rwandan former spy chief Pascal Simbikangwa jailed over genocide,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/14/
rwanda-former-spy-chief-pascal-simbikangwa-jailed-genocide?CMP-share_btn
link
[https://

perma.cc/9HWE-QV4H]. Octavien Ngenzi and Tito Barahira were both convicted of genocide
and crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment. Their initial appeals were heard
in 2017 and the Paris Cour d'Assises upheld the life sentences. These sentences were further
upheld by the Cour de cassation in October 2019. See James Karuhanga, French court upholds
life sentence for two Genocide convicts, THE NEW TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.newtimes.
co.rw/news/french-court-upholds-life-sentence-two-genocide-convicts [https://perma.cc/KR6W-

ERKM].
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imposition of sentencing. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL have each
stated that retribution and deterrence are the principal justifications for
sentencing. 266 There has been some inconsistency in the tribunal
266. Generally, these two principles of sentence were given equal weight, and were to be

combined in some manner with the gravity of the crime and the degree of responsibility of the
offender. There have been several decisions in which the Trial Chambers have concluded that
deterrence must be given primary consideration in the determination of a sentence. See R. v.

Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,

¶ 1234 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia

Nov. 16, 1998), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/

Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment,

[https://permacc/F5RS-WMW3];

¶ 900 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former

Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj03073Ie.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BF5X-7FHX] (stating that, "Individual and general deterrence has a paramount
function and serves as an important goal of sentencing." However, the court then goes on to state
that, "An equally important goal is retribution..."). The majority of decisions that have a

sentencing component to them reference these factors in their decisions. A relative sample
include: Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 455 (Dec.
6, 1999), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-3/trial-judgements/

en/991206.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHF6-UCRE]; Prosecutor v. Kupreski6, Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgment, ¶ 848 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), https://www.icty.org/
Prosecutor v.
x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf [https://permacc/8XSR-9MA5];
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 986 (Jan. 27, 2000), https://unictr.
irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-13/trial-judgements/en/000127.pdf

[https://permacc/4XA8-JYR3]; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment,

¶

2000),
24,
Mar.
Yugoslavia
Former
the
for
Trib.
Crim.
(Int'l
185
[https://perma.cc/4ZNMhttps://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf

PZW4]; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/I -T, Judgment, ¶ 838 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kuntj010222e.pdf [https://perma.cc/55YL-2U7U]; Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,

Judgment,

¶ 847 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001),

https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordiccerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf

[https://permacc/S5B8-

YXYU]; Prosecutor v. Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment,

¶ 33 (Int'l Crim. Trib.

for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/milansimic/tjug/en/sim-

sj021017e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9R9-DE7E]; Prosecutor v. Plaviil, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1S, Sentencing Judgment,

¶

22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),

https://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf

[https://permacc/QJE9-EVLQ];

Prosecutor v. Cesi, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/cesic/tjug/en/ces-tj0403 1 e.pdf

[https://perma.cc/2UMF-ZJ9D] (rehabilitation is also considered an important factor here);
Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentencing, ¶ 498 (July 15,
2004),

https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-O1-71/trial-judgements/

en/040715.pdf [https://perma.cc/89U6-J2CX]; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T,
Judgment, ¶ 458 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005),
[https://perma.cc/H5NR-BJ3F];
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj05OI31e.pdf
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf
[https://permacc/3U3P-7PSR] (also stresses rehabilitation as important but not to be given undue

weight); Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 1134 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/krajud060927e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y2R-EJ8L] (also includes rehabilitation); Prosecutor v.
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decisions of the ICTY and the ICTR in particular with respect to the
priority of one or the other justifications being the predominant principle
for consideration in sentencing. 2 67 However, as Drumbi has noted, "a
survey of all the cases of the ad hoc tribunals over time, though, reveals
a preference for retributive motivations ... ."268 And, any consideration
by these tribunals of the justifications of punishment in their decisions
are perfunctory in nature, without any analysis of why these justifications
should apply, and in what context. 269 Hola describes this as a proforma
listing of the purposes of sentencing, with no clear link to the ultimate
reasoning for the imposition of a particular quantum of sentence. 2 7 0
Concentration is placed on the 'gravity of the offence' as the real
determiner of the sentence to be imposed, noted in the cases as the litmus

Zelenovid, Case No. IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 31 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007), https://www.icty.org/ x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XKR-DAD5 ] (does not include rehabilitation); Prosecutor v. Tamba, Case No.
SCSL-2004-16-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 19, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/

Decisions/AFRC/624/SCSL-04-16-T-624.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8Z4-6URB];

Prosecutor

v.

Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the Sentencing (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.world
courts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2007.10.09_Prosecutor_v_FofanaKondewa.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/GWC4-ZAJ3]; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 1057

(Nov. 28, 2007), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-52/appealschamber-judgements/en/071128.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9EY-QXY2]; Prosecutor v. Boskoski,
Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 587 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10,
2008), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tarculovski/tjug/en/080710.pdf [https://perma
.cc/E9PM-NWR3]; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 1144 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/

milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU4D-EV2W]; Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgment (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.worldcourts.com/

scsl/eng/decisions/2009.04.08_Prosecutor_v_SesayKallonGbao.pdf
2T92]; Prosecutor v. Popovi6, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment,

Former Yugoslavia June

¶

[https://perma.cc/U9Q9-

2128 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the

10, 2010), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610

judgement.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4RH-CL2Z].

267. Ralph Henham, The Internationalisationof Sentencing: Reality or Myth, 30 INT'L J.
Socio. L. 265, 269 (2002); Ralph Henham, The PhilosophicalFoundations of International
Sentencing, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 64, 72 (2003); DRUMBL, supranote 164, at 61; D'AscoLI, supra
note 6, at 297; Barbara Hola, Sentencing of InternationalCrimes at the ICTY and the ITCR, 4
AMSTERDAM L. F. 3, 7 (2012).
268. DRUMBL, supra note 164, at 61.

269. When the ICTY, in particular, commenced its sentencing process, it had in the case of
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic expressed broader philosophical reasons for the imposition of sentence.
These included stigmatizing criminal conduct which infringe fundamental values of humanity.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-

tsj980305e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZR-W22Z]. However, such analysis is the exception, and has
been labelled by Drumbl as an outlier. See DRUMBL, supra note 164, at 61.
270. Hola, supra note 267, at 7, 23.
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test for the determination of the sentence. 271 The justifications of
punishment, whether retribution, deterrence and/or rehabilitation, play no
overt role in the determination of the quantum of sentence. Rather, once
reference is made to these justifications in the sentencing decisions, it is
the concentration on the mechanics of the sentencing process that forms
the framework for the determination of the particular sentence. 2 72 In
accordance with the general approach that the ICC has taken to Article
21 of the Rome Statute, it is doubtful if the Court would open its decision
making process to consider decisions of the ICTY, the ICTR and the
SCSL in its determination of the principles of sentencing to apply.
VIII. PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AS
A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW

To date, the ICC has not adopted an approach to an Article 21(1)(c)
analysis and has been reticent to do so. In the review undertaken for this
work of in excess of six hundred Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeal Chambers
decisions in which Article 21 is referenced, the Court has generally
resisted proposing any approach to the analysis of Article 21(1)(c). 273 For
example, in the case of the Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus the Appeals Chamber
responds to the prosecution claim that there exists a general principle of
law in the legal systems of countries of the world with respect to conflicts
of interest for lawyers with the comment that:
The main additional argument raised by the Prosecutor in the
present appeal relates to the purported existence of a general
principle of law establishing a ban for former prosecutors to
join the defence immediately after leaving the prosecution.
Without intending to define in any detail what is required to
establish a general principle of law, the Appeals Chamber
notes that the practice in the five countries to which the
271. See Prosecutor v. Mucik, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement,
the

Former Yugoslavia Feb.

20,

¶ 731 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for

2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-

aj010220.pdf [https://permacc/YF2G-UWV8].
272. Such an approach has been a consistent one in the sentencing process. Hola as well
comments on this process, noting that judges just list the justifications of punishment with no
further reference as to the effect these justifications have on sentencing outcomes. See Hola, supra

note 267, at 23.
273. Some trial courts have suggested that because of the diversity of positions in various
domestic jurisdictions on the particular issue under consideration, there never will be found
consistent principles common to all jurisdictions that could apply. See Prosecutor v. Nourain, Case

No. ICC-02/05-03/09-168, Decision on Prosecution's Request to Invalidate Appointment of
Counsel to Defense (June 30, 2011), https://www.ice-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR201 _08482.PDF;
Prosecutor v. Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, Concurring Opinion of Judge Wyngaert, ¶ 17 (Dec.
18, 2012), http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2012.12.18_Prosecutor_vNgudjolo
Chui.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6EM-5T9Z].
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Prosecutor has referred is not consistent. Notably, as the
Prosecutor accepts, the practice in one of them (the United
Kingdom) appears to be opposite to the one contended for
by the Prosecutor. 2 7 4
The above commentary by the ICC is in keeping with the generally
conservative approach it has taken to its interpretation of Article 21. As
stated above, while there have been occasions when the ICC has been
willing to set aside its conservative approach to the use of Article 21, it is
not a common practice. It has at times, when the circumstances appeared
to require it, either ignored the strict interpretation of the Statute
demanded by the provisions of Article 21 to accomplish certain goals.2 75
However, as can be seen from the analysis undertaken in this Article, the
ICC can use the Raimondo comparative law approach to determine if
there are principles of law common to the major legal systems of the
world. One of these legal principles is that in the imposition of sentences
for international crimes justifications of punishment through the use of
principles of sentencing are common to at least common law and civil
law legal traditions. Thus, the ICC can legitimately consider principles of
sentence in the determination of appropriate sentences by the Court. What
principles to apply requires a contextual analysis of the purpose of the

Rome Statute coupled with what the Court wishes to accomplish in a
particular case.

274. Prosecutor v. Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-252, Judgment on the appeal of the
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber IV of 30 June 2011 entitled "Decision on the
Prosecution's Request to Invalidate the Appointment of Counsel to the Defense," ¶ 33 (Nov.
I1, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_18736.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY8G-

TEKP] (emphasis added).
275. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2705, Decision on the defence
request to reconsider the "Order on numbering of evidence" of 12 May 2010 (Mar. 30, 2011),

https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_03026.PDF

[https://perma.cc/R8RB-WHWL];

Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2727, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's
Application to Admit Rebuttal Evidence from Witness (Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011 _05473.PDF [https://perma.cc/5SY6-GM4X]; Prosecutor v. Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-0l/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NVK-9ZEQ];
Prosecutor v. Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-410, Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge

Eboe-Osuji (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_09218.PDF
[https://perma.cc/RXR3-74FZ]; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-3040-Anx,
Decision of the plenary of judges on the Defence Application of 20 February 2013 for the
disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun Song from the case (June 11, 2013), https://www.iccsee
also
[https://perma.cc/MWG4-7QU7];
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2013_04193.PDF

Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12-4, Concurring Opinion of Judge
18,
2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_10250.pdf
Wyngaert
(Dec.
[https://perma.cc/CDB5-829U] (making the traditional argument that compliance must be made
with Article 21).
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Thus, the answer to the question posed in the title to this Article is that
Article 21 of the Rome Statute is not an impediment to the development
of sentencing principles by the ICC. The application of the Raimondo
approach does not limit such principles to legal maxims that have been
accepted inforo domestic, but to broader principles of law that have been
recognized and adopted in international law. 2 7 The Raimondo approach
provides the ICC with a broader scope to determine which general
principles of law can apply, especially in the area of sentencing, for
crimes within its jurisdiction. This broader approach should encourage
the ICC to undertake the type of analysis proposed in this Article
whenever it needed to refer to Article 21(1)(c) in order to determine
whether 'principles of law' exist that could apply to the particular
situation under consideration. This is important for two reasons. The first
is that the legitimacy of the Rome Statute as a workable treaty is enhanced
when the Court, born as a result of that treaty, properly applies the
provisions of the Statute in a thoughtful and judicious manner. It must be
remembered that Article 21, as a particular provision setting out the
manner in which the law was to be applied by the ICC, is unique to that
Statute. Rather than rely on the traditional sources of international law set
out in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice, the signatories to
the Rome Statute intended that this hierarchical procedure agreed to by
the negotiating states would provide a 'high level of state control over the
interpretative mandate granted to the court.' 2 77 This is in keeping with the
enhanced degree of mistrust which the negotiating states had towards the
judges of international tribunals, in that there was a perception that if
there was not some attempt to confine the interpretative musings of such
judges, judicial activism might run rampant, contrary to the expressed
wishes of those states who would become signatories to the Rome
Treaty. 278 A failure to abide by the strictures of Article 21, as has occurred
in the failure to subject issues of sentencing to this strict process, can
quickly lead to an erosion of confidence in the Court and its decisions.
The second reason this approach is important is more practical in nature.
As a result of the analysis undertaken in this Article of three common law
countries and two civil law countries, the principle of law that applies is
that the ICC can legitimately consider principles of sentences in making
sentencing determination. 2 7 It is recognized that there is no consistency
276. RAIMONDO, supra note 130, at 19.
277. See Cryer, supra note 31, at 391.
278. See Hunt, supra note 31, at 61; see also Cassese, supra note 31.

279. The analysis undertaken was limited to five countries due to the limitations of space
and the limitations of necessary information. It should be noted however, that in two civil law
countries referenced in two studies published in 2019, the phrase 'principles of sentencing' are
also referenced in the determination of the appropriate sentence for international crimes. A study
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among states of the common law or civil law traditions surveyed as to the
principles that should apply when sentencing for violations of
international criminal law crimes. Indeed, the analysis demonstrates that
those domestic courts that have adopted statutory provisions for the
prosecution of international crimes have simply transposed their
domestic justifications onto international crimes within their jurisdiction
with no analysis of the appropriateness of those justifications to
international crimes. Yet, each state does recognize the necessity for the
use of some principles in the justification for the punishment of those who
violate international criminal law. The issue for the ICC will now be
which principles of sentence should apply to the determinations of
sentence. The ICC will have its own priorities, based on the purpose of
such prosecutions as perceived by the Court, and the sentencing
principles must be reflective of those priorities.

published in 2019 analyzing sentencing in Ethiopia for international crimes, 'principles of
sentencing' as stated in the domestic penal code of 1957, were mentioned in the sentencing
decisions for many of those convicted of genocide and war crimes between 1992 and 2010. See
Taderre Simie Metakia, PunishingCore Crimes in Ethiopia: Analysis of the Domestic Practicein
Light of andin Comparisonwith SentencingPracticesat the UNITCs and the ICC, 19 INT'L CRIM.

L. REV. 160, 172-75 (2019). In the prosecution of international crimes in Croatia, reference is
also made to principles of sentencing during the imposition of penalties after conviction for
international crimes. Those sentencing principles were in codified form but had been changed to
some degree in a new Criminal Code enacted in 2013. See Maja Munivrona Vajda, Domestic

Trials for International Crimes-A Critical Analysis of Croatian War Crimes Sentencing
CRIM. L. REV. 15, 18-23 (2019).

Jurisprudence, 19 INT'L
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